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Date: 9/6/2016
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User: LEU

ROA Report
Case: CV-2015-0003329 Current Judge: Cynthia K.C. Meyer
Linda Dunn vs. Idaho State Tax Commission

Linda Dunn vs. Idaho State Tax Commission
Date

Code

User

5/11/2015

ADMR

LEU

Administrative assignment of Judge

LEU

Filing: L3 - Appeal or petition for judicial review Benjamin R. Simpson
or cross appeal or cross-petition from
commission, board, or body to district court
Paid by: Kochansky, Richard William (attorney for
Dunn, Linda) Receipt number: 0018382 Dated:
5/11/2015 Amount: $221.00 (Cash) For: Dunn,
Linda (plaintiff)

PETN

DEGLMAN

Petition For Review of Idaho State Tax
Benjamin R. Simpson
Comission Decision of April 17, 2015, Appeal No.
14- B -1450

5/20/2015

MISC

HUFFMAN

Statement of Issues

Benjamin R. Simpson

5/22/2015

SUMI

MITCHELL

Summons Issued - L.W.

Benjamin R. Simpson

5/29/2015

ADMR

VIGIL

Administrative assignment of Judge (batch
process)

6/12/2015

AFSV

MMILLER

Affidavit Of Service - 5/27/15 BK obo ISTC

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

6/15/2015

NOTE

MMILLER

Clerk's Notation - Sent To Judge For Review

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

WOOSLEY

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Idaho
State Tax Commission (defendant) Receipt
number: 0022976 Dated: 6/16/2015 Amount:
$.00 (Cash) For: Idaho State Tax Commission
(defendant)

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

WOOSLEY

Answer

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

6/18/2015

ANSW
HRSC

LARSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
08/04/2015 03:00 PM)

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

6/19/2015

NOHG

LARSEN

Notice Of Hearing

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

LARSEN
DIXON

Scheduling Order And Forms Issued

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

6/29/2015

ORDR
RSCN

Scheduling Form-Richard Kockansky

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

7/2/2015

CERT

WOOSLEY

Certificate of Service

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

MISC

HUFFMAN

Scheduling Form - David B Young

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

LARSEN

Notice Vacating Hearing

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

6/16/2015

7/9/2015

Judge
Benjamin R. Simpson

HRVC

LARSEN

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 08/04/2015 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

HRSC

LARSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference
02/11/2016 08:00 AM)

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

HRSC

LARSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled
03/21/2016 09:00 AM) 3 day trial

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

NOHG
ORDR
NOTC
PTOR

LARSEN
LARSEN
LARSEN
LARSEN

Notice Of Pre-Trial Conference And Trial

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

Order For Mediation

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

Trial Notice

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

Scheduling Order, Notice Of Trial Setting And
Initial Pre-Trial Order

Cynthia K.C. Meyer
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Linda Dunn vs. Idaho State Tax Commission
Date

Code

User

7/13/2015

MOTN

MITCHELL

Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

7/24/2015

ORDR

MITCHELL

Order Granting Admission Pro Hae Vice

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

1/4/2016

CONT

LARSEN

Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference
Cynthia K.C. Meyer
scheduled on 02/11/2016 08:00 AM: Continued

CONT

LARSEN

Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled
Cynthia K.C. Meyer
scheduled on 03/21/2016 09:00 AM: Continued
3 day trial

HRSC

LARSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference
07/14/2016 08:00 AM)

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

HRSC

LARSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled
08/15/2016 09:00 AM) 3 day trial

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

LARSEN

Amended Notice of Pretrial Conference/Trial

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

NOTC

LARSEN

Trial Notice

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

1/28/2016

STIP

Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

2/2/2016

HRSC

DIXON
LARSEN

2/22/2016

STIP

DIXON

Joint Stipulation Of Facts

3/29/2016

HRVC

LARSEN

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Cynthia K.C. Meyer
scheduled on 05/03/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated per Young- Young-1 hour

BRIE

Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

Defendant's Opening Brief

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

Reply Brief of Appellant Linda Dunn

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

Judge

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Cynthia K.C. Meyer
Judgment 05/03/2016 03:00 PM) Young-1 hour
Cynthia K.C. Meyer

4/1/2016

BRIE

4/20/2016

BRIE

KOZMA
KOZMA
KOZMA

4/22/2016

BRIE

LARSEN

Defendant's Reply Brief

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

6/8/2016

ORDR

LARSEN

Memorandum Decision And Order On Plaintiff's
Petition For Review

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

7/12/2016

APSC

WOOSLEY

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

WOOSLEY

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Cynthia K.C. Meyer
to Supreme Court Paid by: Kovacevich, Pro
Hae Vice CV 15-3329 ONLY, Robert E (attorney
for Dunn, Linda) Receipt number: 0028147
Dated: 7/12/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For:
Dunn, Linda (plaintiff)

BNDC

WOOSLEY

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 28148 Dated
7/12/2016 for 100.00)

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

INHD

LARSEN

Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference
scheduled on 07/14/2016 08:00 AM: Interim
Hearing Held

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

DCHH

LARSEN

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100 pages

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

7/14/2016

Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

7 of 160

First~·~icial District Court - Kootenai County/"'*'

Date: 9/6/2016
Time: 12:42 PM
Page 3 of 3

User: LEU

ROA Report
Case: CV-2015-0003329 Current Judge: Cynthia K.C. Meyer
Linda Dunn vs. Idaho State Tax Commission

Linda Dunn vs. Idaho State Tax Commission
Date

Code

User

7/21/2016

HRVC

LARSEN

Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled
scheduled on 08/15/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing
Vacated 3 day trial

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

REMT

MITCHELL

Remittitur (entered in error)

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

ORDR

MITCHELL

Order Vacating Remittitur

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

8/1/2016

RTCT

DEGLMAN

Return Certificate-Idaho Supreme Court 7/28/16

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

8/3/2016

CVDI

MITCHELL

Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho State Tax
Commission, Defendant; Dunn, Linda, Plaintiff.
Filing date: 8/3/2016

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

FJDE

MITCHELL

Judgment

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

STAT

MITCHELL

Case status changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

BNDV

LEU

Bond Converted (Transaction number 1496
dated 8/23/2016 amount 100.00)

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

STAT

LEU

Case status changed: closed

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

BNDC

DEGLMAN

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 35072 Dated
8/31/2016 for 8.55)

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

STAT

DEGLMAN

Case status changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

BNDV

LEU

Bond Converted (Transaction number 1542
dated 8/31/2016 amount 8.55)

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

STAT

LEU

Case status changed: closed

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

MISC

LEU

Request For Additional Documents For The
Record

Cynthia K.C. Meyer

8/23/2016

8/31/2016

9/6/2016

Judge
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3
4

RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 667-4595 ISB #2435

5
6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

8
9

10

LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,
Appellant,

11

12

)

V.

13

IDAHO .STATE TAX COMMISSION,
14

15

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No.

(:V \.:>·

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
IDAHO STATE TAX
COMMISSION DECISION OF
APRIL 17, 2015, APPEAL NO.
14-B-1450

Respondent.
___________

16
17

Appellant, Linda Dunn, individually and as surviving spouse of Barry Dun('

18

who died on October 26, 2012, pursuant to I.C. § 63-3812, petitions this Court

19

for judicial review of the decision issued by the Respondent Idaho State Tax

20

Commission on April 17, 2015, entering a tax deficiency and tax penalties against

21

Appellant. The matter was heard on October 15, 2014, at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
22
23
24

before Hearing Officer Cindy Pollack. The recording is in her possession. A copy
of the final decision and order is attached to this petition as Exhibit A.

25
26
27
28

Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 1

Assigned to
Linda

nn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

1

FACTS

2
3

The tax years involved in this proceeding are December 31, 2000, 2001 1

4

2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009 and 2010. Appellant has paid all the tax assessed

5

by Respondent. No probate proceedings have been commenced in any state. The

6
7

Respondent has admitted that Barry Dunn, deceased husband of Linda Dunn, the

8

Petitioner, was never a resident of the state of Idaho at any time during the years

9

involved. The Respondent also admits that all the income on which the state of

10

Idaho assessed Idaho income tax, was on the income earned by Barry Dunn's

11

12

personal effort when physically present in Alaska, Washington or Texas. None of

13

Barry Dunn's employers, during the time involved, had an office or any activity in

14

the state ofldaho that would give any employer a tax nexus in Idaho. Dunn never

15

worked in Idaho. He moved from Alaska where he was a resident to Texas where

16

he established residency. Barry Dunn was a project manager and worked on the
17
18

Lindelhoven and other oil fields. He lived where he worked. He obtained driver's

19

licenses, voted, paid state income and sales taxes in the states where he was

20

employed. Linda Dunn, during some of the times involved, was present in Idaho,

21

but never took any action that would change her residency to Idaho.

22
23

Barry Dunn changed his residency from Alaska to Texas. The residency of

24

Linda Dunn, for purposes of determining whether any of her husband's income

25

derived from his personal labor, remains at his state of residency which is Texas.

26
27

28

Linda

Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 2

nn vs Idaho State Tax Commission
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1

2

Texas law, Family Code § 3.102(1), provides that the sole manager of income

3

earned by labor of the spouse is managed separately by the spouse whose labor

4

earned the income. Linda Dunn did not earn any of the income that is taxed by

5

the state of Idaho in this case. It was all earned by the toil, talent and personal

6
7

effort of Barry Dunn in the state of Texas. The residence of Barry Dunn controls

8

the character of income he earned in Texas. The personal income earned by him

9

in Texas was treated as his separate property.

10

He was given complete

management and control of the wages under Texas law, the place where he earned

11

12
13
14
15

it. Idaho community property law cannot transmute Barry Dunn's income to
Linda Dunn.
The state of Idaho offered no governmental benefit to Barry Dunn. The
community property laws of the state of Idaho do not apply to a Texas resident,

16

17

who earned the income while physically present in Texas.

Blangers v. Idaho

18

Deparlment of Revenue, 114 Idaho 944, 963 P.2d 1052 (1980) applies. Barry

19

Dunn "did not owe his livelihood" to Idaho.

20

anything that it can ask in return. Appellant never agreed that Idaho law applied.

Idaho did not give Barry Dunn

21

No probate has been commenced in any state. Barry Dunn had no property in
22
23
24

Idaho. I.C. § 63-3029 recognizes the issue of out of state credit to income taxes
charged by other states. Texas has no income tax.

25
26
27

28

Linda

Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 3
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1

2

The state of Idaho has no nexus to apply its income tax law to a non

3

resident of Idaho, on personal income earned in another state where the non

4

resident resides and is physically present in that state. Barry Dunn had to be

5

physically present in Texas in order to earn the income. The U.S. Const. art. 4,
6

7

§ 2, places each state upon equal footing with citizens of other states. This right

8

secured by the privileges and immunities clause applies to income tax imposed by

9

states. One of the rights secured by the privileges and immunities clause is that

10

a citizen is not subject to pay a greater amount of income tax than a citizen who

11

12

earns income in another state. The state of Idaho taxed Petitioner Linda Dunn on

13

personal income earned by her husband, Barry Dunn, a citizen of Texas where his

14

personal services earned the income. No Texas income tax is levied on Barry

15

Dunn's wages by the state of Texas. The privileges and immunities clause applies.

16
17

The state of Idaho, who has no nexus to apply its income tax, cannot exact a

18

greater amount than Texas. See e.g. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal,

19

522 U.S. 287, 118 S. Ct. 766, 139 L.Ed 2d 717 (1998). The Dormant Interstate

20

Commerce Act requires equal treatment. I.C. § 63-3026A taxes non residents on

21

income " ... derived from or related to sources within Idaho".

Income earned by

22
23

Barry Dunn's personal effort in Texas is not related in any way to Idaho.

24

Blangers, supra at 948 states that: "there be a sufficient nexus between the

25

presence, property or activities of the non resident and the state attempting to

26
27

28

Linda

Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 4

unn vs Idaho State Tax Commission
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1
2

impose the tax in order to survive a challenge under the due process clause or the

3

commerce clause." Therefore, the due process clause of the Fourteenth

4

Amendment is violated. There is no presence, property. or activity within Idaho

5

to tax wages earned in Texas by Barry Dunn.

6
7

The state of Idaho also failed to recognize that Barry Dunn had a right to

8

rely on his tax preparer on an issue of first impression. The application of tax

9

penalties failed to recognize that reasonable care was taken in the preparation of

10

the returns.

11

12

In issuing its decision, the Commission erred in taxing the income earned

13

by Barry Dunn while a resident of Texas and domiciled in that state. A transcript

14

of the hearing is not requested. A separate statement of issues will be filed within

15

14 days. The entire deficiency is based on the income earned in Texas. The

16

decision, including penalties, is erroneous, capricious, illegal and without
17

18

justification of either facts or law.

19

WHEREFORE, Appellant prays for judgment against Respondent as follows:

20

1.

For a determination that Respondent erred in assessing any tax or

21

penalties against Appellant and that the decision is without any factual or legal
22
23
24

25

basis; it is erroneous, arbitrary and capricious without any factual or legal
foundation.

2.

That the final order and decision be reversed.

26
27

28

Linda

Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 5

nn vs Idaho State Tax Commission
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1

2
3

4
5

3.

That all amounts paid to the Respondent for the years indicated be

refunded, plus interest.
4.

That all amounts paid as penalties be refunded as no penalties apply.

5.

For such other and further relief as to this Court deems just and

6
7
8

equitable.
DATED this

1L day of May, 2015.

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25
26
27

28

Linda

Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax
Commission Decision of April 1 7, 2015 - 6

unn vs Idaho State Tax Commission
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1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

3

4
5

I, Richard W. Kochansky, hereby certify that a copy of this Petition has been
sent to Alan R. Pack, Respondent's Representative, by First Class Mail to:

8

Mr. Alan R. Pack
Tax Policy Specialist
Idaho State Tax Commission
800 Park Blvd., Plaza IV
Boise, ID 83712-7742

9

DATED this //

6
7

day of May, 2015.

10
11

12

Attorney for Appellant

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25
26
27

28

Linda

Petition for Review of Idaho State Tax
Commission Decision of April 17, 2015 - 7

nn vs Idaho State Tax Commission
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RECEIVED
APR 2 O 2015'

BEFORE THE IDAHO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

LINDA DUNN,
Appellant,
V.

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

R.E. KOVACEVICH, P.LL.C.

APPEAL NO. 14-8-1450
FINAL DECISION
AND ORDER

INCOME TAX APPEAL

This appeal is taken from an Idaho State Tax Commission (STC) decision
issued June 6, 2014 on Docket No. 25096. The agency decision affirmed a
Notice of Deficiency Determination dated April 13, 2012. The appeal
concerns taxable years 2000, 2001, 2003 thru 2005, and 2007 thru 2010.
This matter came on for hearing October 15, 2014 in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
before Hearing Officer Cindy Pollock. Attorneys Richard Kochansky and
Robert Kovacevich represented Appellant at hearing. Alan Pack represented
Respondent STC:·
Board Members David Kinghorn, Linda Pike and Leland Heinrich participated
in this decision.
The issue on appeal is the proper tax treatment of income earned by a
spouse domiciled in a different community property state.
The decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission is affirmed.

FINDINGS OF FACT
For the taxable years 2000, 2001, 2003 through 2005, and 2007 through 2010,
Appellant was married, and Appellant's husband (Husband) was a resident of Texas and
Washington and earned Texas and Washington source income. Appellant filed some partyear income tax returns in Idaho and also earned income sourced in Idaho for some of the
-1-

Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission
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Dunn
Appeal No. 14-B-1450

years in question. During its review, Respondent determined in addition to Appellant's
income, one-half(½) of Husband's income should have been included as taxable income
for the years concerning this appeal. Appellant contested the tax treatment of Husband's
income.
Appellant argued the major substantive issue in this case concerns the wages
earned by Husband while he was in the state of Texas during the relevant tax years on
appeal. Citing McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 Tex. 187 (1849), Appellant contended Husband was
not a resident of Idaho and the states in which he lived controls ownership.

It was

contended, according to law, Husband's residency prevails on his Texas wages. The main
point of contention was the domicile of husband "automatically becomes the domicile of
wife." Further, Appellant indicated neither spouse was a resident of Idaho on Husband's
Texas wages under the "residence by operation of law" principle.

Several points of

contention of residency, non-residency and part-time residency were raised.
Husband passed away in 2012. Appellant argued the State Tax Commission, nor
the Board of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter until Husband's probate is
commenced. Federal statutes and the Constitution were cited in this regard. Respondent
countered Husband was not a resident of Idaho during the years in question and the tax
deficiency does not concern Husband, but rather only Appellant (Wife).
Lastly, Appellant maintained if taxes were owed, there was authority in which
penalties would be avoided as Appellant "acted in good faith and reasonable cause on
income not earned in Idaho." Respondent claimed Idaho Code Section 63-3046 dictates
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when penalties are assessed.
Respondent explained Appellant filed Idaho part-year/nonresident income tax
returns for the taxable years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. On the returns, Appellant's
losses, capital gains and/or losses, interest and dividend income were reported. On the
2010 return some Idaho wages were also reported. In examining the 2007 through 2010
returns, Respondent determined Appellant was a resident of Idaho in the years before this
period. On closer review, Respondent found no Idaho individual income tax returns had
been filed after taxable year 1999 and before 2006. Therefore, the taxable years 2000
through 2005 were examined. In the audit findings, it was reported the only time Appellant
changed residency from Idaho was when Appellant resided in Alaska for the full-year in
2002. Respondent found no issues with Appellant's returns for taxable years 2002 and
2006, thereby excluding these two (2) years from the deficiency determination.
Respondent explained information and documentation provided by Appellant
necessitated the need for Idaho returns for tax years 2000, 2001, and 2003 through 2005.
The documentation was in the form of a completed Idaho State Tax Commission
Residency/Domicile Questionnaire for taxable years 2007-2009. Appellant answered a
home was being occupied in Idaho, nothing was done to change status from resident of
Idaho to a nonresident of Idaho, a business was operated in Idaho, and 365 days per year
were spent in Idaho during 2007 thru 2009. Appellant also indicated on the form she was
registered to vote in Idaho and personal vehicles were registered in Idaho.

Further

documentation was provided in the way of two (2) Homeowner's Exemption Applications.
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The first was dated in 1991 and signed by Appellant declaring the Idaho residence was
being occupied by owner. Appellant sold this property in 2006 and purchased another in
2008. The second Application was dated in 2008 and again Appellant stated the residence
was owner-occupied. Also on the later application, Appellant declared she was a full-year
resident, had an Idaho Driver's license, and cars were registered in Idaho.
In addition to the non-filed returns, Appellant's income was found by Respondent
to be improperly reported for taxable years 2007 through 2010. Adjustments to Appellant's
returns were made and included in the Notice of Deficiency Determination. Respondent
contended after multiple correspondence efforts with Appellant, the only issue remaining
was the determination and allocation of the community property income. Respondent
explained, as a resident of Idaho, Appellant was required to report all income derived from
any source for purposes of determining her Idaho income tax liability.

As such,

Respondent found half of Husband's income was attributable to Appellant as taxable
income by way of Idaho being a community property state.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Board's goal in its hearings and other proceedings is the acquisition of
sufficient, accurate evidence to support a final determination of a fair and just tax
assessment. This Board, giving full opportunity for all arguments and having considered
all testimony and documentary evidence submitted by the parties in support of their
respective positions, hereby enters the following conclusions.
There are several issues before the Board in this case.

Each which will be

-4Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

20 of 160

Dunn

Appeal No. 14-B-1450
addressed separately. The first question concerns Appellant's residency for each of the
tax years relevant to this case. Appellant stated she did not reside in Idaho some of the
years in question. However, the associated testimony was vague and it was unclear which
years Appellant was declaring to be a resident, part-year resident, or nonresident of Idaho.
Respondent maintained Idaho was Appellant's residency or part-time residency
state for the years in question. From record we find Appellant owned and occupied two (2)
residences in Idaho and received the homeowner's exemption on such properties.
Appellant operated an Idaho business for some of the years in question. Further, on the
Idaho STC Residency/Domicile Questionnaire, Appellant declared her vehicles were
registered in Idaho, she was registered to vote in Idaho, and maintained an Idaho drivers
license. For tax years 2007 through 2009 Appellant declared she lived in Idaho 365 days
each year. Appellant was receiving the homeowners exemption on her residence for all
the years under appeal.

Further, for some of the years, Appellant filed part-

year/nonresident returns. The evidence leads the Board to conclude Appellant was shown
to be a resident of Idaho for some years and a part-year resident for others.
Idaho Code § 63-3002 calls for levying taxes on the taxable income from all
sources, "wherever derived", of all Idaho residents. In this case, Appellant was a resident
of Idaho in the relevant years asserted. As such all Appellant's income is considered
taxable, unless expressly exempted, which is not the case here.
A different tax treatment of Husband's income was Appellant's main contention.
There is no dispute Appellant and Husband were married during the tax years in question.
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Appellant and Husband chose the filing status of "married filing jointly'' and filed tax returns
accordingly. Idaho is a community property state and as a community property state, it is
presumed all property acquired by either spouse after marriage is community property, to
which each spouse has an undivided one-half interest.
Idaho Code § 32-906 provides in pertinent part,
[t]he income, including all the rents, issues and profits, of all property,
separate or community, is community property unless the conveyance by
which it is acquired provides or both spouses, by written agreement
specifically so providing, declare that all or specifically designated property
and the income . . . be the separate property of the spouse to whom the
property belongs.
Husband's income was acquired after his marriage to Appellant. Nothing in the
record indicates there was any written agreement between Appellant and Husband to treat
Husband's income as his separate property.

The income is therefore presumed

community property, to which Appellant owns a one-half interest. As a result, Appellant's
one-half interest in Husband's income is attributable to Appellant's taxable income under
the relevant provisions of the Idaho Tax Code.
The Board disagrees with Appellant's assertion that Appellant's community property
interest remains with the state in which Husband is domiciled. Washington and Texas are
community property states like Idaho and therefore the income is equally attributable to
each spouse. We find one-half(½ ) of Husband's income is attributable to Appellant and
should be treated as such on her Idaho income tax returns.
Appellant maintained if taxes were determined to be owed, interest and penalties
should not apply. Respondent maintained there was no good basis for waiving the
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penalties and interest.
Idaho Code Section 63-3046. Penalties and additions to the tax in case of
deficiency. (a) If any part of any deficiency is due to negligence or disregard
of rules but without intent to defraud, five percent (5%) of the total amount
of the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be assessed, collected
and paid in the same manner as if it were a deficiency.

(c) (1) In the event the return required by this chapter is not filed on or before
the due date (including extensions) of the return, there may be collected a
penalty of five percent (5%) of the tax due on such returns for each month
elapsing after the due date (including extensions) of such returns until the
return is filed.
(g) Total penalties imposed under subsections (a), (c) and (d) of this section
and undersection_63-3033, Idaho Code, shall not exceed twenty-five percent
(25%) of the tax due on the return.
The Board does not find where the State Tax Commission must abate penalty and
interest. We understand the STC may impose penalty and interest as reflected in Idaho
Code above. We have not identified any special facts or authority on which this Board
should overturn the decision of the STC. Therefore we deny taxpayer's request for
abatement of penalties and interest.
For the years at issue, the Board concludes Appellant must report all income from
Idaho sources, as well as one-half (½) of the amount of Appellant's community property
interest in Husband's out-of-state wages. For the reasons expressed above, the Board
affirms the conclusions and findings in the decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission.
FINAL ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing Final Decision, IT IS ORDERED that the decision
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of the Idaho State Tax Commission be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
DATED this 17th day of April, 2015.

NOTICE OF APPEAL PRIVILEGES
Enclosed is a Final Decision and Order of the Idaho State Board of Tax Appeals
concerning an appeal.
Motion for reconsideration of the hearing record or motion for rehearing the appeal
(with good cause detailed) may be made by filing such motion with the Clerk of the Board
within ten (10) days of mailing of the Final Decision and Order, with a copy of the motion
being sent to all other parties to the proceeding before the Board.
According to Idaho Code§ 63-3812, either party can appeal to the district court from
this decision. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 63-3812, the appeal shall be taken and perfected
in accordance with Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
cp
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of April, 2015, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing FINAL DECISION AND ORDER by the method indicated below and
addressed to each of the following:
Richard W. Kochansky

408 E. Sherman Ave., #309
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

5"I U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Facsimile
D STATEHOUSE MAIL

Robert Kovacevich

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 525
Spokane, WA 92201-0995

D Hand Delivered
D Facsimile
D STATEHOUSE MAIL

Alan Pack

D

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Idaho State Tax Commission

D

Hand Delivered

D

Facsimile

P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83722

fil STATEHOUSE MAIL
Ronna Bell
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RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 667-4595 ISB #2435

2015 HAY 20 PH 3: 23

4
5
6

7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

8

9

10

LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,

11

12

Appellant,

v.

13

14
15

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.
___________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. CV15-3329
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

16
17
18
19
20

Now comes Appellant, Linda Dunn, and sets forth the following issues:
1.

Can the state of Idaho tax Linda Dunn on one half of the wages her

husband, Barry Dunn, earned while a resident of Texas and who was physically
present in Texas when he earned the salary.

21
22
23

24

25

2.

Does Idaho community property law apply to salary of a Texas

resident who earned the income in Texas.
3.

Does Texas law, Texas Family Code § 3.102(a)(l) (Vernon's Texas

Statutes and Code annotated Title 1, Subtitle B, Subchapter C), providing for

26
27

management and control of earnings to the earner as if he were single and

28

Statement of Issues - 1
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specifically rejecting joint control prevent any attribution of the earnings to Linda

2
3

4
5
6

Dunn.
4.

Does the case of Valdez v. Rameriz, 574 S.W. 2d 748 (Texas 1978)

holding that sole management of earnings also preempted the non earing Spouse's
disposition of the income, require a decision in favor of Linda Dunn?

7

5.

Can wages earned by the husband and controlled by the husband

8
9

10
11
12

under the law of the state where earned be presumed to be the wife's property or
does actual receipt need be proved from husband earner to wife.
6.

Are wages earned by non resident husband in Texas not derived from

or related to sources within Idaho and therefore not subject to Idaho income tax

13

14
15

16

17

pursuant to I.C. § 63-3026A.
7.

Do wages earned in Texas by a resident of Texas while domiciled in

Texas have a taxable nexus in Idaho? If not, is lack of nexus a violation of due
process and the commerce clause preventing Idaho income?

18

19

20
21

22

8.

Was Linda Dunn an Idaho resident?

9.

For purposes of imputation of wages earned by the husband while a

resident of another state, does the residency of the husband become the residency
of the wife.

23
24
25

10.

What did Idaho give in return to Barry Dunn to tax wages he earned

as a Texas resident while working in Texas.

26
27

28
Statement of Issues - 2
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1

11.

Can Idaho community property law preempt Texas community

2

property law on the issue of management and control of a Texas resident's wages
3
4

5
6

earned in Texas?
12.

Is the reciprocal credit statute in Idaho LC.§ 63-3029 a violation of

the U.S. Constitution Art. 4, § 2, the privileges and immunities equal burden

7

provision?
8

9

13.

Does the case of Lunding v. New York Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287,

10

118 S.Ct. 766, 139 L. Ed 2d 717 (1998) applying the equal footing privileges and

11

immunities constitutional provision apply to this case?

12

14.

In any event should penalties in this case be denied as the issue was

13
14

novel and first impression?

15

15.

Should the tax assessment be reversed?

16

DATED this iLJ_ day of May, 2015.

17
18

~+-------RICHARD W. KdCHANSKY, ISB #2435
Attorney for Appellant

19
20
21
22

23
24

25
26
27

28
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1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

I, Richard W. Kochansky, hereby certify that a copy of this Statement of
3

4

Issues has been sent to Alan R. Pack, Respondent's Representative, by First Class

5

Mail to:

6

7
8

9

10

Mr. Alan R. Pack
Tax Policy Specialist
Idaho State Tax Commission
800 Park Blvd., Plaza IV
Boise, ID 83712-7742
DATED this ~ 6 day of May, 2015.

11

12
13

ANSKY, ISB #2435
Attorney for Appe lant

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25
26
27

28
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LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
DAVID B. YOUNG [ISB #6380]
PHIL N. SKJNNER [ISB #8527]
DEPUTJES ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
P.O.BOX36
BOISE, ID 83722-0410
(208) 334-7530
Attorneys for the Idaho State Tax Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LINDADUNN,

Plaintiff,
-vsIDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,

______________
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-15-3329

ANSWER

)

COMES NOW the Idaho State Tax Commission (Tax Commission), by and through its

attorney, David B. Young, Deputy Attorney General, and answers the Plaintiffs Petition fol'

Review (Complaint).

I.
STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
This Action Should Proceed as an Original De Novo Bench Trial under Idaho Code § 6J3049. This Action Should Not Proceed as a Petfdon for .ludtclaJ Review under
I.R.C.P. 84 or the Idaho Adminl-.tratJve Procedure Act •
An appeal of a Tax Commission decision is governed by Idaho Code § 63-3049. Idaho

Code § 63-3049 states that a taxpayer may appeal a decision of the Tax Commission by filing a
complaint with the district court. The case is to proceed as other civil cases, but is to be a bench
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The standard of review for this appeal is de 11ovo. Parker v 1

06-15-2015

Jdaho State
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Ta~

Commission, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010). Thus, the case is treated as a regular civil
action under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing for discovery. depositions, etc. There
is no submission of an ugency record ms would happen under Rule 84, Idaho Rules of Ci vii
Procedure, or the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act.
This case is not a "petition for judicial review., governed by I.R.C.P. 84. Rule 84(a)(l)
instructs that "[ w]hen judicial review of an action of a state agency or local government is

expressly provided by statute but no stated procedure or standard of review is provided in that
statute, then .Rule 84 provides the procedure for the district Court's judicial review." Idaho

Code § 63-3049 expressly provides the procedure and standard of review for the judicial review
of a "redetermination by the' state tax commission" (i.e., a final decision of the Tax

Commission), and thel'efore the procedures of Rule 84, I.R.C.P., do not apply.
This case is also not a "petition for judicial review., under the Idaho Administrative
Procedure Act. Tbe administrative hearing and appeals process before the Tax Commission ls
not conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Idaho Code § 63-107 (hearings
before the Tax Commission concerning a redetennination of taxes "are not contested cases
within the meaning of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code"); Idaho Code § 67-5240.
The Tax Commission does not record the hearings or otherwise compHe nn administrative
record. Accordingly, an appeaJ from a decision of the Tax Commission cannot be confined to a
review of the record beJow, but must proceed as an original action in the distrkt court.
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Finally, this is not an appeal of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. Rather, this

proceeding ls a de navo appeaJ by the district court of the Tax Commission's decision, pursuant
to Idaho Code § 63-3049.

II.
RESPONSES TO COMPLAINT
The True Commission responds to the factual allegations of the Complaint as set forth

below. The Tax Commission denies ench and every allegation not specifically admitted. The
denials are made (1) bused upon the Tax Commission's lack of sufficient information to either
admit or deny; (2) because Plaintiff's statem~nts are factually incorrect; or (3) because Plaintiff's
assertions are legal conclusions requiring no admission or denial.

The Tax Commission admits and asserts: Plaintiff Linda Dunn {Ms. Dunn) is and has
been a resident of Idaho for the taxable years in question: 2000-2001, 2003-2005, and 2007-2010

(taxable years). Ms. Dunn was married to Barry Dunn (Mr. Dunn) during all the years in
question, until Mr. Dunn's death in 2012.
During the taxable years, Mr. Dunn resided variousJy in the states of Washington and
Texas where he worked and earned wages. Mr. Dunn· s wages. based upon Jabor in other states,
is not reportabJe to Idaho. But as an Idaho resident> Ms. Dunn is required to report her income
and pay tax in Idaho on her income from whatever source derived. However, Ms. Dunn never
reported her community property interest in the wages that Mr. Dunn earned during the taxable
years.
Accordingly, the Tax Commission assessed taxes for the taxable years in the amount of
$60,294, which amount is the tax attributable to Ms. Dunn's one-half community property
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interest in the wages earned by her husband. la addition to the tax assessed, statutory interest
and penalties are owed.

Ms. Dunn protested her tax liability. interest and penalties, attributable to the wages Mr.
Dunn earned out·of-state, to the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission upheld the tax
assessment by its Decision, dated June 6, 2014. Ms. Dunn has now paid the required percentage

of her tax liability in order to pursue this appeal to the District Court.

m.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Defendant, the Idaho State Tax Commission, asks this Court for the

followfog relief:
l. Dismiss the Complaint tbr failure to state a ground upon which relief can be granted.

or jn the alternative. grant a judgment in favor of the Commission based upon the pleadings,
and aHowing Plaintiff to take nothing by its Complaint;

2'. Affirm the Decision of the Commission;
3. Order Plaintiff to pay all of the Commission's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees

incurred in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 63-3049, J2-117, and 12-121; und
4. Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems reasonable and necessary to
accomplish tile demands of justice.
DATED this /

£"'

day of June 2015.

IJ?AHO STATE TAX COMMISSION

ANSWER-4
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

33 of 160

208-334-7844

TAX LEGAL

Idaho State Tax Commission

or-~3 p.m.

06-15-2015

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I bere~y certify that on this j
day of June 2015, I have served a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing Tax Commission's ANSWER upon Plaintiff as indicated
below:
RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. SHERMAN, SUITE 309
COEUR D'ALENE. ID 83814
[Cotmsel for Plaintiff]

___ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

___ Hand Delivered
__.....,...._Overnight Mail
'5< Telecopy (Fax) (208) 765-3867
Email

----

DAVID YOUNG
DEPUTY ATTORNEY G
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
IDAHO A'ITORNEY GENERAL
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DAVID B. YOUNG [ISB # 6380]
PHlL N SKINNER [ISB #8527]
DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
P.O.BOX36
BOISE, ID 83722-0410
TELEPHONE: (208) 334-7530
FAX: (208)334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho State Tax Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
L1NDADl'NN.

Plaintiff,

-vsIDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASENO. CV-15-3329

JOINT STIPULATION
REGARDING SCHEDULING

--------------)
COME NOW, the parties to this action, pursuant to this Court's order, and present the
following joint stipulated agreement:

1.
2.

.The .P~es wis~ te>, .re~()Ive. this ~~te.r. on 8:11. 11.~e.ed-~pon recorci; .
To that end, the parties will work to complete a stipulation of fact containing all

the facts necessary for the resolution of this case, including any agreed-upon exhibits, by

February 19, 2016;
3.

Both parties will simultaneously file and serve written argument in the form of a

brief on or before April 1, 2016;
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4.

The parties agree that they will each file and serve an answering brief due on or

before April 22, 2016;

5.

The parties reserve the right to request oral argument on the submitted record;

6.

Should the parties be unable to agree as to a stipulation of fact and agreed exhibits

by February 19, 2016, then the above briefing schedule will be vacated and the matter will

proceed to trial.
DATED this '2.J day of January 2016.
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION

DATED this_ day of January 2016.
ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH, PLLC

ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH, of the Firm
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
-ADMITTED .P.RO. HAC VICE .....
DATED this_ day of January 2016.

/,/
RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
COUNSEL FOR PEmIONER
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/~1.,

4.

Tlttt parties agn.-e that the)' wiU each

me and !erve at, 1uu1weri.r.g brief due on or

!)eforc April 22, 2016~

5.

The panies reseri,·c the: ri&ht to request oral at'gun1ent on tbe submitted record;

6.

Shollld the panies be unable to agr£e as tQ a stipulation of fact Md a ~ exhibi1s

by Februazy 19, 2016, then the above briefmg schedt.tl¢ will be- vac4tcd IJld the matter will
.P~erd to triaJ.

DATED this_ day cf January 2016.

IDAHO STATE TAX COMf,..flSS!ON

DAVIO B. YOUNO
DEPtlTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DATED t h ~ y of January 2016.
ROBERT E. KOVACEVJC.H. PLLC

BERT fi. KOVA VJCH, of the Finn
COU:-JSEL FOR PETITIONER
ADMJTI".SD PRO HAC VIC.E
DATED r.hia.AA1y uf Jan1.NUY2016.

RICHARD W. J<OCH.~NS1':Y
COUNSEL FOR. PETITlONER.
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ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH
ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH, PLLC
818 West Riverside Avenue, Suite 525
Spokane, WA 99201-1914
Telephone: (509) 747-2104
Facsimile: (509) 625-1914
RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 667-4595 ISB #2435

Attorneys for Linda Dunn
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,
Appellant,
-vsIDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-15-3329
JOINT STIPULATION OF
FACTS

On January 27, 2016, counsel for parties agreed to resolve this matter on the record and
stipulate facts by February 19, 2016.

It is hereby stipulated between the parties, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
6(e)(3) that, for the purposes of this case, the following statements may be accepted as facts and
all exhibits referred to herein, if any, and attached hereto may be accepted as admissible without
foundation and are incorporated in this stipulation and made a part hereof.
1. This appeal was timely filed in this Court.

Joint Stipulation ofFacts - I
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2.

Barry and Linda Dunn were married for all the years at issue in this case. The taxable

years at issue are 2000-200t 2003-2005, and 2007 -2010. Linda Dunn has paid the required
amounts to allow her to process this appeal.
3. This case is an appeal from a final decision and order of the Idaho Board of Tax
Appeals dated April 17, 2015, No. 14-B-1450. A copy of the decision is attached as Appendix A.
4. The parties agree that Barry Dunn's residence is not at issue in this case during any of
the years in question. Likewise, the parties agree that Linda Dunn's residency is not at issue in
this case. For purposes of this appeal only, and for no other purpose, the parties stipulate that
Linda Dunn was an Idaho resident for the taxable years. However, it is stipulated that Barry
Dunn was not an Idaho resident for any of the taxable years involved. The only issue on appeal
from the Board of Tax Appeals is whether Linda Dunn is liable for income tax on her one-half
community property interest in the wages earned by her husband, Barry Dunn, while he lived
outside Idaho.

5. The Board of Tax Appeals decision was entered only against Linda Dunn. Barry
Dunn, Linda's deceased husband, died of cancer in 2012. No probate of Barry Dunn's estate was
commenced in Texas, Idaho or any other state.
6. Linda Dunn's then husband, Barry Dunn, lived in states other than Idaho during all
years at issue in this case. The parties agree that Barry Dunn lived in Washington in 2000, in
either Washington or Alaska in 2001; lived in Alaska in 2002; in Alaska or Texas in 2003; and
lived in Texas from 2004 until October 2010.
7. During all the years, Barry Dunn was employed by Udelhoven Inc., 4606 F.M. 1960
. . 'I.M.
~oad,. Houston,
Texas, during all the years involved in the case. Udelhoven operated
.
.

.

offshore drilling platforms. Barry Dunn was employed by Udelhoven as a project manager. His
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employment required that he be personally present at the site of the project. He always resided in
the states where he worked. During all the years involved, he never worked in Idaho. His work
schedule was six weeks on and one week off. During all the years in question, Udelhoven had no
business or office in Idaho. Barry Dunn's driver licenses were always issued in the state where
he worked. During the periods involved, he did not have an Idaho driver license. While in Texas,
Barry Dunn's vehicle was a Jeep Liberty vehicle licensed as a Texas vehicle. He obtained a
Texas resident driver license. During the time Barry and Linda Dunn lived in Alaska, they lived

in a house owned by them in Nikiski, Alaska. When in Washington, they lived in a rented home
in Bellingham, Washington. After Alaska, Barry Dunn moved to Texas and he lived in a motorhome in Texas. Linda Dunn, until 2008, lived with Barry Dunn in the motor-home during the
winters and returned to Idaho to operate the horse farm the rest of the year. Barry Dunn did not
work at the horse farm. During and after 2008, Linda Dunn lived with Barry Dunn. but the
majority of her time was spent in Idaho. All of Barry Dunn's pay from Udelhoven, his only
employer, was directly deposited in his bank account in the city of Tomball, Texas. Both Barry
and Linda Dunn lived at 1402 Cherry Street, Tomball, Texas. Barry Dunn's Texas resident
driver license listed the Tomball address. All the earnings at issue in this case were earned by
Barry Dunn personally as a wage earner in the states of Texas, Alaska or Washington. Barry
Dunn, from 2004 through 2010, was physically present in Texas and earned the income by his
personal effort in Texas, mostly on off-shore drilling platforms. During all the years in question,
he never worked in Idaho or earned wages in any capacity in Idaho.
DATED this_ day of February, 2016.

ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH
Counsel for Linda Dunn
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RECEIVED
APR 2 0 2015'

BEFORE THE IDAHO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS

)

LINDA DUNN,

R.E. KOVACEVICH, P.l.LO.

)
Appellant,

)

APPEAL NO. 14-8-1450

)
V.

) .
)

FINAL DECISION
AND ORDER

)
)
)
)
)
)

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

INCOME TAX APPEAL
This appeal is taken from an Idaho State Tax Commission (STC) decision
issued June 6, 2014 on Docket No. 25096. The agency decision affirmed a
Notice of Deficiency Determination dated April 13, 2012. The appeal
concerns taxable years 2000, 2001, 2003 thru 2005, and 2007 thru 2010.
This matter came on for hearing October 15, 2014 In Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
before Hearing Officer Cindy Pollock. Attorneys Richard Kochansky and
Robert Kovacevich represented Appellant at hearing. Alan Pack represented
Respondent STC:·
Board Members David Kinghorn, Linda Pike and Leland Heinrich participated
in this decision.

The issue on appeal is the proper tax treatment of income earned by a
spouse domiciled in a different community property state.
The decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission is affirmed.
FINDINGS OF FACT

For the taxable years 2000, 20011 2003 through 2005, and 2007 through 2010,
Appellant was married, and Appellant's husband (Husband) was a resident of Texas and
Washington and earned Texas and Washington source income. Appellant filed some partyear income tax returns in Idaho and also earned income sourced in Idaho for some of the
-1-
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years in question. During its review, Respondent determined in addition to Appellant's
income, one-half(½) of Husband's income should have been included as taxable income
for the years concerning this appeal. Appellant contested the tax treatment of Husband's
income.
Appellant argued the major substantive Issue In this case concerns the wages
earned by Husband while he was in the state of Texas during the relevant tax years on

appeal. Citing McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 Tex. 187 (1849), Appellant contended Husband was
not a resident of Idaho and the states in which he lived controls ownership. It was
contended, according to law, Husband's residency prevails on his Texas wages. The main
point of contention was the domicile of husband "automatically becomes the domicile of
wife." Further, Appellant indicated neither spouse was a resident of Idaho on Husband's
Texas wages under the "residence by operation of law" principle.

Several points of

contention of residency, non-residency and part-time residency were raised.
Husband passed away in 2012. Appellant argued the State Tax Commission, nor
the Board of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter until Husband's probate is
commenced. Federal statutes and the Constitution were cited in this regard. Respondent
countered Husband was not a resident of Idaho during the years in question and the tax

deficiency does not concern Husband, but rather only Appellant (Wife).
Lastly, Appellant maintained if taxes were owed, there was authority in which
penalties would be avoided as Appellant "acted in good faith and reasonable cause on
income not earned in Idaho." Respondent claimed Idaho Code Section 63-3046 dictates

-2-
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when penalties are assessed.
Respondent explained Appellant filed Idaho part-year/nonresident income tax
returns for the taxable years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. On the returns, Appellant's
losses, capital gains and/or losses, interest and dividend income were reported. On the
2010 return some Idaho wages were also reported. In examining the 2007 through 2010
returns, Respondent determined Appellant was a resident of Idaho in the years before this
period. On closer review, Respondent found no Idaho individual Income tax returns had
been flied after taxable year 1999 and before 2006. Therefore, the taxable years 2000
through 2005 were examined. In the audit findings 1 it was reported the only time Appellant
changed residency from Idaho was when Appellant resided in Alaska for the full-year in

2002. Respondent found no issues with Appellant's returns for taxable years 2002 and
2006, thereby excluding these two (2) years from the deficiency determination.
Respondent explained information and documentation provided by Appellant
necessitated the need for Idaho returns for tax years 2000, 2001, and 2003 through 2005.
The documentation was in the form of a completed Idaho State Tax Commission
Residency/Domicile Questionnaire for taxable years 2007-2009. Appellant answered a
home was being occupied In Idaho, nothing was done to change status from resident of
Idaho to a nonresident of Idaho, a business was operated in Idaho, and 365 days per year
were spent in Idaho during 2007 thru 2009. Appellant also Indicated on the form she was
registered to vote in Idaho and personal vehicles were registered in Idaho. Further
documentation was provided in the way of two (2) Homeowner's Exemption Applications.
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The first was dated in 1991 and signed by Appellant declaring the Idaho residence was

being occupied by owner. Appellant sold this property in 2006 and purchased another in
2008. The second Application was dated in 2008 and again Appellant stated the residence
was owner-occupied. Also on the later application, Appellant declared she was a full-year
resident, had an Idaho Driver's license, and cars were registered in Idaho.

In addition to the non-filed returns, Appellant's income was found by Respondent
to be Improperly reported for taxable years 2007 through 2010. Adjustments to Appellant's
returns were made and included in the Notice of Deficiency Determination. Respondent
contended after multiple correspondence efforts with Appellant, the only issue remaining
was the determination and allocation of the community property income. Respondent
explained, as a resident of Idaho, Appellant was required to report all income derived from

any source for purposes of determining her Idaho Income tax liability.

As such,

Respondent found half of Husband's income was attributable to Appellant as taxable
income by way of Idaho being a community property state.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This Board's goal in its hearings and other proceedings is the acquisition of
sufficient, accurate evidence to support a final determination of a fair and just tax
assessment. This Board, giving full opportunity for all arguments and having considered
all testimony and documentary evidence submitted by the parties in support of their
respective positions, hereby enters the following conclusions.
There are several issues before the Board in this case.

Each which will be

-4-
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addressed separately. The first question concerns Appellant's residency for each of the
tax years relevant to this case. Appellant stated she did not reside in Idaho some of the
years in question. However, the associated testimony was vague and it was unclear which
years Appellant was declaring to be a resident, part-year resident, or nonresident of Idaho.
Respondent maintained Idaho was Appellant's residency or part-time residency
state for the years in question. From record we find Appellant owned and occupied two (2)
residences in Idaho and received the homeowners exemption on such properties.
Appellant operated an Idaho business for some of the years in question. Further, on the
fdaho STC Residency/Domicile Questionnaire, Appellant declared her vehicles were
registered in Idaho, she was registered to vote in Idaho, and maintained an Idaho drivers
license. For tax years 2007 through 2009 Appellant declared she lived in Idaho 365 days
each year. Appellant was receiving the homeowners exemption on her residence for all
the years under appeal.

Further, for some of the years, Appellant filed part-

year/nonresident returns. The evidence leads the Board to conclude Appellant was shown
to be a resident of Idaho for some years and a part-year resident for others.
Idaho Code § 63-3002 calls for levying taxes on the taxable Income from all
sources, "wherever derived", of all Idaho residents. In this case, Appellant was a resident
of Idaho in the relevant years asserted. As such all Appellant's income is considered
taxable, unless expressly exempted, which is not the case here.
A different tax treatment of Husband's income was Appellant's main contention.
There is no dispute Appellant and Husband were married during the tax years in question.
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Appellant and Husband chose the filing status of "married filing jointly" and filed tax returns
accordingly. Idaho is a community property state and as a community property state, It is
presumed all property acquired by either spouse after marriage is community property, to
which each spouse has an undivided one-half Interest.
Idaho Code § 32~906 provides In pertinent part,
[t]he income, Including all the rents, issues and profits, of all property,
separate or community, is community property unless the conveyance by
which it Is acquired provides or both spouses, by written agreement
specifically so providing, declare that all or specifically designated property
and the Income ... be the separate property of the spouse to whom the
property belongs.
Husband's income was acquired after his marriage to Appellant. Nothing in the
record Indicates there was any written agreement between Appellant and Husband to treat
Husband's income as his separate property.

The income is therefore presumed

community property, to which Appellant owns a one-half interest. As a result, Appellant's
one-half Interest in Husband's income is attributable to Appellant's taxable income under
the relevant provisions of the Idaho Tax Code.
The Board disagrees with Appellant's assertion that Appellant's community property
interest remains with the state In which Husband is domiciled. Washington and Texas are
community property states like Idaho and therefore the income is equally attributable to
each spouse. We find one-half(½ ) of Husband's Income is attributable to Appellant and
should be treated as such on her Idaho income tax returns.
Appellant maintained if taxes were determined to be owed, interest and penalties
should not apply. Respondent maintained there was no good basis for waiving the
-6-
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penalties and interest.
Idaho Code Section 63-3046. Penalties and additions to the tax in case of
deficiency. (a) If any part of any deficiency is due to negligence or disregard
of rules but without intent to defraud, five percent (5%) of the total amount
of the deficiency (In addition to such deficiency) shall be assessed, collected
and paid in the same manner as if it were a deficiency.

...

(c) (1) In the event the return required by this chapter is not filed on or before
the due date (including extensions) of the return, there may be collected a
penalty of five percent (5%) of the tax due on such returns for each month
elapsing after the due date (Including extensions) of such returns until the
return is filed.
(g) Total penalties imposed under subsections (a), (c) and (d) of this section
and under section.63-3033, Idaho Code, shall not exceed twenty-five percent
(25%) of the tax due on the return.
The Board does not find where the State Tax Commission must abate penalty and
Interest. We understand the STC may impose penalty and interest as reflected in Idaho
Code above. We have not identified any special facts or authority on which this Board
should overturn the decision of the STC. Therefore we deny taxpayer's request for
abatement of penalties and interest.
For the years at issue, the Board concludes Appellant must report all income from
Idaho sources, as well as one-half(½) of the amount of Appellant's community property
interest in Husband's out-of-state wages. For the reasons expressed above, the Board
affirms the conclusions and findings in the decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission.
FINAL ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing Final Decision, IT IS ORDERED that the decision
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of the Idaho State Tax Commission be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
DATED this 17th day of April, 2015.

NOTICE OF APPEAL PRIVILEGES
Enclosed is a Final Decision and Order of the Idaho State Board of Tax Appeals
concerning an appeal.
Motion for reconsideration of the hearing record or motion for rehearing the appeal
(with good cause detailed) may be made by filing such motion with the Clerk of the Board
within ten (10) days of mailing of the Final Decision and Order, with a copy of the motion
being sent to all other parties to the proceeding before the Board.
According to Idaho Code§ 63~3812, either party can appeal to the district court from
this decision. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 63-3812, the appeal shall be taken and perfected
in accordance with Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
cp
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of April, 2015, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing FINAL DECISION AND ORDER by the method indicated below and

addressed to each of the following:
Richard W. Kochansky
408 E. Sherman Ave., #309

fill
D

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

D

STATEHOUSE MAIL

Robert Kovacevich

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

818 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 525

D
D
D

Facsimile

D

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

D

Hand Delivered

D

Facsimile

_fg'j

STATEHOUSE MAIL

Spokane, WA 92201-0995

Alan Pack
Idaho State Tax Commission

Hand Delivered

STATEHOUSE MAIL

P.O. Box 36

Boise, to 83722

Ronna Bell
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STATE OF IDAHO
} SS
COUNTY Of KOOTENAI
FILED•

RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 667-4595 ISB #2435
ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH, PLLC
818 West Riverside Avenue, Suite 525
Spokane, WA 99201-1914
Telephone: (509) 747-2104

Attorneys for Linda Dunn
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,
Appellant,

v.
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. CVlS-3329
APPELLANT LINDA DUNN'S
OPENING BRIEF

This case is on review of the Idaho State Tax Commission Decision of April
17, 2015, Appeal No. 14-13-1450. The parties have stipulated and have agreed

to submit this case to the Court on the stipulation and briefs of the respective
parties. The opening briefs are due April 1, 2016.
PROCEDURE

Barry Dunn, the worker whose wages are at issue, died in 2012. No probate
of Barry Dunn's estate has been commenced in any state.

Linda Dunn, as

surviving spouse, paid the assessment and by this appeal seeks a refund.
Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief - 1
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FACTS
The salient facts of this case are that the residency of Barry Dunn or Linda
Dunn, during the taxable years involved, is not an issue in this case.

For

purposes of this case, only Linda Dunn is agreed to be an Idaho resident, but not
Barry Dunn. The stipulation is that the only issue on appeal "is whether Linda
Dunn is liable for income tax on her one half community property, interest in the
wages earned, by her then husband, while he lived outside ofldaho." Barry Dunn
lived in Washington in 2000, in either Washington or Alaska in 2001, lived in
Alaska in 2002, in Alaska and Texas in 2003, and lived in Texas from 2004 until
October of 2010. Barry Dunn's sole employer during all the years at issue in this
case was employed by Udelhoven Inc. as a project manager of offshore drilling
platforms. Udelhoven was headquartered in Houston, Texas, and never had any
business or business office in Idaho. Barry Dunn had a resident Texas drivers
license, and always had a residence where he lived. Barry Dunn's paychecks were
deposited in his Texas bank account. The taxable years at issue are 2000-2001,
2003, 2005, and 2007-2010.
Unlike Parkerv. Idaho Tax Commission, 148 Idaho 842,230 P.3d 734 (2010),
Idaho, where the taxpayer stipulated that Idaho community property laws apply,
id. at 846, this case applies the law of Texas where Barry Dunn lived, worked and

was paid. Linda Dunn has not stipulated that Idaho community property laws
apply.
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The only income at issue is Barry Dunn's wages.
None of the wages were earned in Idaho.
In this case, the income in question is all wages earned by Barry Dunn, a
non resident of Idaho. The wages were all earned by Barry Dunn as a project
manager on location completely outside Idaho. Linda Dunn's argument is that the
law of the place where the wages were earned applies. It is also Linda Dunn's
position that the community property law that applied to the wages is based on
Barry Dunn's residency, which is not Idaho. The stipulated facts include that
Barry Dunn had a resident Texas drivers license, licensed his car as a Texas
vehicle, and lived in Tomball, Texas. He did not have an Idaho drivers license.
Where no income earned by a non resident is earned in Idaho, the internal
consistency test of the Interstate Commerce Clause is violated. There is no nexus.
Idaho is not entitled to any income tax. ITX Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission,
128 Idaho 483,486,915 P.2d 713 (Idaho 1996). Like Blangers v. State, Dept. of

Revenue and Taxation, 114 Idaho 944, 763 P.2d 1052 (Idaho 1988), the due
process clause is violated. "No business productivity generated by Idaho was
accountable for the wages earned-." Id. at 951. If services were not rendered in
the state, the salary received by a non resident is not taxable. Hayes v. State Tax

Commission, 401 N.Y.S.2d 876 (S.C.N.Y. 1978).
In Leach v.

Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 2004 WL 717353

(Wis.Tax.App.Com. - Wisconsin 2004), the husband received a payment on a
covenant not to compete from a Wisconsin company. Both husband and wife were
Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief - 3
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residents of Florida. Since the payment was a non tangible, the income derived
from Wisconsin was not taxable by Wisconsin.
The subsequent paragraphs contend that the Texas community property law
applies to the earner if the wage income and Texas law treats wages as solely
controlled by the earner. The wages are not subject to the debts or the non earner
spouse. Basic federal constitutional law prevents application of the State law of
Idaho to tax wages earned by a non resident.

The tax in Idaho violates the Privileges and Immunities clause of the
U.S. Constitution art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
In Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. 1191, 43 L.Ed.2d 530
(1975). New Hampshire imposed a tax on income earned by New Hampshire
residents out of state, but exempts the income if the tax of the state where it is
earned does not tax the income. The state also taxed the income of a non resident
working in New Hampshire. The court invalidated the tax on the rule of comity
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id at 665.

The case held that

disparate treatment of residents and non residents was prohibited. Here, not
allowing an exemption if the state where the wages were earned does not have an
income tax is disparate treatment.

The tax fails the Internal Consistency Test.
The state ofldaho Code, I.C. 63-2039, allows a credit for income taxes paid
to another state. Personal earnings are taxed in the state where earned. Texas
has no income tax. The recent case of Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v.
Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief - 4
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Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015) applies and requires a decision
in Linda Dunn's favor. The issue in Wynne was that the state of Maryland did not
get a credit for a Maryland County tax on income earned in another state, but did
get a credit against a state income tax paid on income in another state. The
Supreme Court held that failure to give a credit for the county tax was a violation
of the dormant commerce clause. The Court affirmed the principle that the tax
failed the internal consistency test "because it created a risk of multiple taxation"
by taxing income earned "interstate at a rate higher than earned intrastate."
The Court quoted Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines Inc., 514 U.S.
175, 179, 115 S.Ct. 1331, 131 L.Ed.2d 261 (1995) as stating that the dormant
commerce clause prohibits state taxation even when Congress has failed to
legislate on the subject. Id. at 1794. The Court held that the failure to allow the
credit "operates as a tariff' and is invalid. Id at 1804. Here internal consistency
is only applicable if the state of Idaho allows earned income under sole control of
the non resident spouse to be free of Idaho state tax for the reason that it was free
of state tax in Texas where it was earned, controlled and paid. The limitation of
credit to states that grant similar tax advantages is discriminatory and violates the
commerce clause. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,274, 108
S.Ct. 1803, 100 L.Ed.2d 302 (1988). Oklahoma, among other cases, at 175 cited
and relied on Western Live Stock v. Bureau ofRevenue, 303 U.S. 250, 58 S.Ct. 546,
821 L.Ed. 823 (1938). The case involved a services partnership whose only office
and place of business was New Mexico. All the events "occur in New Mexico and
Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief - 5
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not elsewhere." Id. at 260. The interstate commerce was "too remote and too
attenuated." Id. at 259. The Court held that New Mexico was entitled to the full
amount of tax as interstate commerce of the sales of magazines was too remote.
The same theory applies here as Idaho's community property laws cannot apply
to a spouse who did not earn the income that her non resident spouse earned in
Texas and elsewhere, completely outside of Idaho. The domicile of the husband
controls, especially when payment of money is the issue. McIntyre v. Chappell, 4
Tex. 187, 1849 WL 3994 (Texas 1849).
All the wages earned are free of state tax where earned. The residence of a
non earner spouse who cannot control the earnings, the earnings cannot be liable
for Linda Dunn's debts, which would include Idaho State tax debts, hence Idaho
has no right to tax Barry Dunn's earnings. The Wynne court also cited Ann.co Inc.

v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984), a case holding
that discrimination based on an interstate element is invalid. Ann.co imposed a
state gross receipts tax higher on businesses selling steel in West Virginia than
local sellers and manufacturers. The Court applied Boston Stock Exchange v. State
Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 97 S.Ct. 599, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) and quoted

from the case: "No State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or
the business operations performed in any other State." Boston Stock Exchange,

id. at 319, imposed a tax on out of state sales more heavily than in state sales.
These cases apply as Idaho is imposing a tax on Barry Dunn's wages, that is
higher, solely based on the fact that Linda Dunn, the non wage earner, lived in
Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief - 6
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Idaho. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766,
139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) involves the same tax as here involved, state income tax.
It denied unequal income tax treatment to a non resident as a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution Art. IV, § 2, entitling
"citizens of each state add to all the Privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several states." This is based on comity between states. "Further, the manner in
which New York taxes nonresidents, based on an allocation of an 'as if' resident
tax liability, not only imposes upon nonresidents' income the effect of New York's
graduated tax rates." Id. at 314. Here, Barry Dunn has sole control of his wages,
but is subjected to Idaho taxes. It is against public policy to apply another state's
laws. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 123 S.Ct. 1683,
155 L.Ed.2d 702 (2003) applied the full faith and credit clause. U.C. Const. art.
IV,§ 1, and held that a Nevada Court was not required to apply California law.
The Court would not apply the state of Nevada's tax collection laws to a Nevada
resident. The Court would not balance state tax laws. Id. at 499.

Hansen v. Scott, 687 N.W.2d 247 (S.C.N.D. 2004) followed Hyatt and applied
Texas law to Texas residents. The place where payment is made is the place
where the income was received. See, e.g., Insteel Industries, Inc. v. Constanza

Contracting Co., Inc., 276 F.Supp.2d 479, 487 (D.C. Virginia 2003).

Barry Dunn

was paid in Texas. Texas law applies. Courts look to the law of the domicile for
a reason. The domicile has the requisite contacts with a particular individual or
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personality to generate a state interest in defining his or her property rights and
how they may be transferred. To select, as the WPRA suggests, the law of a state
to which the individual or personality is a stranger, constitutes no less random an
act than blindly throwing darts at a map on the wall. Experience Hendrix L.L. C.

v. HendrixLicensing.com, LTD, 766 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1138 (D.C.W.D. Wash. 2011)
(holding laws negating domicile unconstitutional). A traffic stop in Minnesota that
did not allow evidence of a California authorization for medical marijuana is not
a constitutional violation.

State v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605 (Minn. 2014).

"Minnesota need not incorporate California's decision to permit medical patients
to possess and use marijuana." Id. at 615.
The internal consistency test applies here as the wages earned in Texas were
not taxable for Texas State income tax. Seven states have no state income tax on
wages. The states include Alaska, Texas and Washington. These are all the
places where Barry Dunn was a resident in this case.

The Texas State

Constitution Article 8, Section 24, mandates that the legislature alone does not
have the right to impose a personal income tax. Subsection (a) states that a
general law "by the legislature that imposes a tax on the net incomes of natural
persons must provide that the portion of the law imposing the tax not take effect
until approved by the majority of registered voters voting in a statewide
referendum held on the question of imposing the tax." Idaho is trying to tax the
income earned by a non resident of Idaho, earned wholly interstate in Texas, at
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Idaho's income tax rates. Linda Dunn did not earn the income. Her husband
earned it in Texas.
The law of Texas, where the Idaho non resident earned the wages paid in
Texas for the non resident's personal toil and talent while personally present in
Texas and a non resident of Idaho, are not income in Idaho. The Texas statute on
marital rights and liabilities, Subchapter B Management Control and Disposition,
V.T.C.A. Family Code, Ch 3, § 3.102, states in full:
§ 3.102

Managing Community Property

(a)
During marriage, each spouse has the sole management,
control, and disposition of the community property that the spouse
would have owned if single, including:
(1) personal earnings;
(2) revenue from separate property;
(3) recoveries for personal injuries; and
(4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from,
all property subject to the spouse's sole management,
control, and disposition.
(b)
If community property subject to the sole management,
control, and disposition of one spouse is mixed or combined with
community property subject to the sole management, control, and
disposition of the other spouse, then the mixed or combined
community property is subject to the joint management, control, and
disposition of the spouses, unless the spouses provide otherwise by
power of attorney in writing or other agreement.
(c)
Except as provided by Subsection (a), community
property is subject to the joint management, control, and disposition
of the spouses unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of
attorney in writing or other agreement.
Section § 3.101 states in full: "Each spouse has the sole management
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control and disposition of that spouse's separate property." 3.102(b) also provides
that sole management liability is not subject to the non tortious debts of the non
earning spouse. The personal earnings of Barry Dunn were subject to his sole
management, control and disposition in the same manner "that the spouse would
have owned if single." If Barry Dunn was single, the property would be separate
property.

Sole Management Community, also called Special Property, is not liable
for the non earners debts.
Thomas Featherston Jr., author of "Marital Property Liabilities: Dispelling
the Myth of the Community Debt," states:

Matrimonial Property Act, 1967
Historically in Texas, the husband managed not only the
community property of the marriage but also the separate property
of both spouses. A women's rights reform movement began in 1913
with the gradual expansion over the next fifty years of the wife's right
to manage her own separate property and personal earnings. One of
the early changes was to grant to the wife the right to manage her
own personal earnings and the income from her separate property.
This reform movement culminated in 1967 when both spouses were
granted separate but equal rights in the management of their
respective separate properties. The Matrimonial Property Act of 1967
also granted women for the first time the right to manage their special
community property and equal rights with their husbands to manage
their joint community property.
This reform movement also
introduced a complementary system of divided liability of community
property, which also incorporated two related, but separate
concepts": (i) liability of property and (ii) the personal liability of a
spouse. These concepts were initially codified as Sections 5.61 and
5.62 of the Texas Family Code enacted in 1967, effective Jan. 1,
2000, and are codified currently as Sections 3.201, 3.202 and 3.203
of the Texas Family Code. See Joseph W. McKnight, "Recodification
and Reform of the Law of Husband and Wife" (Texas Bar Journal,
Jan. 1970).
A.
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B.

Texas Family Code

SEPARATE PROPERTY
Each spouse has sole management, control and disposition of
his or her separate property. Tex. Fam. Code Sec. 3.101.
1.

2.

SOLE MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Each spouse has sole management, control and disposition of
the community property that he or she would own, if single, including
personal earnings, revenue from separate property, recoveries for
personal injuries and increases and revenues from his or her "special
community property." Tex. Fam. Code Sec. 3.102(a).
3.

JOINT MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY PROPERTY
All other community property is subject to both spouses' joint
management, control and disposition - "the joint community
property." Tex. Fam. Code Sec. 3.102(b).

C.

Special Community Property
The term "special community property" was originally defined
by Texas courts as that portion of the community estate which was
under the wife's exclusive control and not liable for the husband's
debts following the landmark decision of Arnold v. Leonard, supra,
where the Texas Supreme Court held that the legislature could not
define the rents and revenue from the wife's separate property and
her personal earnings as her separate property, but could exempt
those assets, her "special community property," from his debts. Moss
v. Gibbs, 370 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1963). Today, it is common practice
to refer to the community assets subject to either spouse's "sole
management, control and disposition" under Section 3.102(a) as his
or her "special community property."
One spouse's special
community property is generally not liable during the marriage for
the other spouse's contractual debts or any debts of the other spouse
that were incurred prior to marriage. See Patel v. Kuciemba, 82
S.W.3d 589 (Tex. Civ. App. - Corpus Christi, 2002 pet. Denied) and
IV, A.2., infra. ..
D.

Summary
A spouse's separate property and special community property,
as well as the joint community property, are liable for that spouse's
debts. If the liability is a tort debt incurred during the marriage, the
other spouse's special community property is also liable fo the debt
(the other spouse's separate property is exempt).
Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief - 11
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

63 of 160

If the debt is not a tort debt incurred during the marriage, the

other spouse's separate property and special community property are
exempt from the debt unless the other spouse is personally liable
under other rules oflaw. In which event, the other spouse's property
(i.e., that spouse's special community and separate) is liable as well.
Montemayor v. Ortiz, 208 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. Ct. Of Appeals 2006) reviews the

law of Texas and notes that Texas labels sole management community property.
Id. at 643. Sole management community property is not liable for the debts of the

other spouse. Id. at 645. See also Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879 (S.C. Tex.
1999) stating that earning capacity during marriage is sole management
community property.
conclusive.

Perez v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 671 (S.C. Texas 1979) 1s

Roberto Perez was on active duty during the marriage.

A

readjustment payment was payable for Roberto's active service, some of which
occurred during the marriage. Marian, Roberto's exwife, petitioned for part of the
payment as her community interest. The Court held that loss of earnings during
marriage. The award was denied as the award was not community property.
White v. White, 710 So.2d 208 (D.C. Fla. 1998) reviews Texas law and concludes

that under Texas law the lump sum separation payment on discharge from the
navy was no community property under Texas law. Id. at 211.

Conclusion.
Barry Dunn's wages were sole management community property and treated
the same way as separate property.

Separate property is not Community

property. Linda Dunn is entitled to the refund.

Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief - 12
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

64 of 160

DATED this .1...!J_ day of March, 2016.

RICHARD W. KOCHAN Y, ISB #2435
Attorney for Appellant, Linda Dunn

Counsel for Linda Dunn
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I, Richard W. Kochansky, hereby certify that a copy of this Opening Brief
has been sent by Email and by First Class Mail to:
David B. Young
Phil N. Skinner
Deputies Attorney General
State of Idaho
P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83722-0410
DATED thisd.Tday of March, 2016.
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DEPUTIES ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
P.O.BOX36
BOISE, ID 83722-0410
TELEPHONE: (208) 334-7530
FAX: (208) 334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho State Tax Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LINDA DUNN,

)
Plaintiff,

-vs-

)

CASE NO. CV-15-3329

)
)
)

DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF

)

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,

)
)

Defendant.

)

--------------)
COMES NOW, Defendant Idaho State Tax Commission (Tax Commission), pursuant to
the Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling filed herein, and submits its opening brief in support
of its request for Judgment in its favor.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is a personal income. tax case.
In lieu of a trial, the parties proposed to resolve this matter on an agreed-upon record.

See Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling, filed herein, January 28, 2016. To that end, the
parties agreed to file a stipulation of fact "containing all the facts necessary for the resolution of
this case." Id. Accordingly, the parties have now filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts, together with
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one Appendix, with this Court in order to resolve this matter. Joint Stipulation of Facts, filed
herein, February 22, 2016 ("Stipulation").
The chief issue to be resolved-as agreed to by the parties-is whether the Plaintiff,
Linda Dunn (Linda), an Idaho resident, may avoid paying Idaho income tax for the taxable years
on her comnnmity property share of the wages earned by her husband, Barry Dunn (Barry),
while he lived and worked outside Idaho. Stipulation at ,r 4.
Here are the main facts of this case:

Barry and Linda Dunn were married for all the years at issue in this case. Stipulation at ,r
2. These years at issue are 2000-2001, 2003-2005, and 2007-2010 ("taxable years"). Stipulation
at ,r 2. Barry later died in 2012. Stipulation at ,r 5.
For the taxable years, the Tax Commission issued a notice of deficiency in April 2012
due to the Dunns' failure to report and pay tax on Linda's share of their income. Stipulation,
Appendix "A." The Dunns protested the notice of deficiency to the Board of Tax Appeals.
Stipulation. Appendix "A."
After review, the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the Tax Commission's notice of
deficiency, that one-half of Barry's out-of-state wages were taxable in Idaho because, according
to Idaho community property law, one-half of those wages are attributable as income to Linda,
an Idaho resident. Stipulation, Appendix "A.,, (The Board of Tax Appeals' Final Decision and
Order is attached to the Stipulation as Appendix "A.") That Decision is what is being appealed
to this Court. Stipulation at ,i 3.
It is important to note what this case is rutt about: this Court is not being asked to make

factual findings about Linda's or Barry's residence dwing the years in question. Stipulation at ,r
4. That is because the parties agree that Linda was an Idaho resident. Stipulation at ,r 4.
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Likewise, the parties agree that Barry was nQt a resident of Idaho (either as a resident of
Washington, Alaska, or Texas). Stipulation at ,r 4. The parties agree that, during all the relevant
years, Barry's wages were entirely earned from his out-of-state employment. and not in Idaho.
Stipulation at 17.
The parties also agree that the sole issue before this Court is whether the Board of Tax
Appeals erred when it detennined that, as an Idaho resident, Linda is entitled to a one-half share
of the income earned by Barry while he was an out-of-state resident as community property; and
that this one-half share is reportable in Idaho as income and subject to Idaho income tax.
Stipulation at 1 4.
Note: The facts of this case very closely match the facts of a recent Idaho Supreme Court
case, involving a husband and wife and the Tax Commission, known as Parker v. Idaho State
Tax Com'n, 148 Idaho 842,230 P.3d 734 (2010). Because the holding in the Parker case
resolves the issue in this case (as discussed below), we append that decision to this brief for ease
of reference. See Appendix to this brief.
For the reasons set forth below, this Court should uphold the decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals and enter Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A taxpayer may appeal a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals to the district court.
Idaho Code§ 63-3812. The case is to proceed before the Court without a jury "as though it were
an original proceeding in the district cowt" or in other words, a de novo bench trial. Idaho Code

DEFENDANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 3

Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

69 of 160

S/25

208-334-7844

TAX LEGAL

Idaho State Tax Commission

03:01:59p.m.
I~,

04-01-2016

§ 63-3812(c). 1 The scope of the district court's review is limited to those issues presented to the

Board of Tax Appeals. I.C. § 63-3812(c).
A deficiency detennination of the Commission is presumed to be correct, and the burden
is on the taxpayer to show that the deficiency is erroneous. Parsons v. Idaho State Tax
Commission, 110 Idaho 572,574, 716 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Ct. App. 1986). The burden is on the
party seeking affirmative relief to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Board of
Tax Appeals' decision is "erroneous." I.C. § 63-3812(c).
Where the parties have stipulated to the relevant facts, as here, tWs Court may simply

apply the law to the stipulated facts. The district court is to issue a written decision with findings
of facts and conclusions of law. I.C. § 63-3812(c). The district court's written findings of fact
will not be disturbed unless they are "clearly erroneous." Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a). On appeal, the
appellate court exercises "free review" over questions of law. Mann v. Granite Reeder Water Hf
Sewer Dist., 143 Idaho 248,251, 141 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2006).

III. ARGUMENT
For the reasons set forth below, this Court should find that the Board of Tax Appeals'
Decision and Order are correct, and issue Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission.
A. As an Idaho resident, Linda is subject to Idaho income tax law and must
report all income from whatever source derived.

Under Idaho law, an individual's residency affects ones income tax liability. That's
because a person's residency determines what income the State of Idaho can tax. In Idaho, it is
1

This case is not a "petition for judicial review" governed by Rule 84, I.R.C.P. Rule 84(a)(l) instructs that "[w)hen
judicial review of an action of a state agency or local government is expressly provided by statute but no stated
procedure or standard of review is provided in that statute. then Rule 84 provides the procedure fur the district
Court's Judicial review." However, Idaho Code§ 63·3812 eicpressly provides the procedure and standard ofreview
for the judicial review of a Board of Tax Appeals decision, and therefore the procedures of Rule 84, 1.R.C.P., do not
apply.
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the intent of the legislature to impose a tax on Idaho residents' income "wherever derived."
Idaho Code § 63-3002. The term "resident," for income tax purposes generally means any
individual who is either "domiciled" in Idaho for the entire year. or who maintains a place of
abode and who spends more than 270 days within this State. I.e.§ 63-3013.
A "resident" is tmced on all of their income received while living in Idaho, regardless of

where it is earned. It is well established that domicile itself affords a basis for a state's
individual income tax. New York, ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1937) ("That
the receipt of income by a resident of the te1Titory of a taxing sovereignty is a tmcable event is
universally recognized. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in the state and the attendant
right to invoke the protections of its laws are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs

of government.")
Rather than needlessly arguing over residency, the parties have stipulated that Linda was
an Idaho resident during all the taxable years. As an Idaho resident, Linda is liable for tax on her
income, no matter the source.
To be clear, Idaho is W2t claiming that Barry owed tax on his one-half share of his out-ofstate earnings. (Plaintiff's filings and pleadings in this case seem to confuse this issue.) While
even nonresidents are required to pay tax on income from Idaho sources (I.C. § 63-3002), the
parties agree that Barry's wages are not from an Idaho source. Stipulation, at~ 7. He was not a
resident of Idaho, and that income earned is not from an Idaho source. The tax liability in this
case is due to Linda's status as an Idaho resident. There is no need to contest whether Idaho can
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tax one-half of Barry's out-of-state income as Idaho is not claiming he owes Idaho tax on that

arilount. 2
In summary, because Linda was an Idaho resident during the taxable years, the receipt of
income by her is a taxable event and she is subject to Idaho's tax laws. Cohn, 300 U.S. at 312313. As a threshold matter, Linda is required to report all of her income for the taxable years, no
matter the source. I.C. § 63-3002.
B. According to the Parker case, Linda has a one-half share in the income
her husband earned out-of-state, and she must report that to Idaho as
income.

Idaho is a community property state. This means that generally, property acquired during
the maniage is owned jointly by each spouse. Income earned during maniage, regardless of its
source, is community property. I.C. § 32-906. Specifically, a spouse's wages earned during
marriage are community property. Suter v. Suter. 97 Idaho 461, 466, 546 P.2d 1169, 1174
(1976). This means that one spouse's wages acquired during the maniage is owned jointly by
each spouse; or, each spouse owns the equivalent of a one-half interest in the value of the
property.
There is a legal presumption that property acquired during marriage is to be community
property. Baruch v. Clark, 154 Idaho 732,737,302 P.3d 357,362 (2013). "[A) party wishing to
show that assets acquired during maniage are separate property bears the burden of proving with
reasonable certainty and particularity that the property is separate." Id. In this way, a marital
community is analogous to a partnership where each partner shares equally in the income.

z In the Petition filed herein, Plaintiff asserts that the State of Idaho cannot assert personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident. As a general legal principle, this is true. The Plaintiff's reference to cases like 0,gnaldson v,
Dgnaldson. 11 Idaho 951 (1986) in support of this general principle is not incorrect. However, Plaintiff misapplies
that case law to this case. He mistakenly thinks that Idaho is asserting jurisdiction over Barry in this case. The tax
owed here is not due to Idaho reaching out to a non-resident and taxing that non-resident.
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Idaho law is clear that just because members of the community may live apart does not
change this result. ''Even when spouses are separated, their earnings and acquisitions constitute
community property." Donaldson v. Donaldson, 111 Idaho 951,957, 720 P.2d 426,432 (Ct.

App. 1986). This is because the marital community comes into being at marriage and only ends
when one spouse dies or they divorce; thus, earnings of either spouse, while living separate and
apart, if not divorced, are community property. Idaho Code§ 32-601; Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho
461,546 P.2d 1169 (1976). This community property law applies to Linda, an Idaho resident,
and a member of a marital community.

As an Idaho resident. Linda is required to report to Idaho half of the combined

community income as her income. Because wages earned during the existence of marriage, and
as an Idaho resident, Linda has a community property interest in the income that Barry earned
during the existence of the marital community. The Tax Commission detennined that the Dunns
did not accurately report the community property split of their community income. Linda's onehalf share of the wages earned by Barry belongs to her as a part of the community property.

One-half of the out-of-state income is included in the community income taxable by Idaho by
virtue of Linda's Idaho residency, and not by virtue of Barry's contacts with Idaho.
This one-half interest in the wages earned is income to Linda. As an Idaho resident, such
income is to be reported by Linda to Idaho for tax purposes. Linda must pay tax on her
community share of the income her husband earned, even if that income was earned out of state.
Federal tax Jaw, too, recognizes community income in community property states. For

federal tax purposes. one-half of all community income is attributed to each spouse. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944); U.S. v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971). Thus,
under federal law, in a community property state, a wife will be treated as having received one-
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half of her husband's income even though she never actually received the income, and even
though the spouses lived apart during the tax year. See, Brent v. Comm'r oflntemal Revenue,
630 F.2d 356 (5 th Cir. 1980).

As stated above. the facts of this case are remarkably on point with Parker v. Idaho State
Tax Com'n (Parker). 148 Idaho 842,230 P.3d 734 (2010). In Parker, the wife was a resident of
Idaho (like Linda), and the husband earned wages while out of state (like Barry). Similarly, the
couple in Parker objected to the Tax Commission taxing the wife's one-half community property
share of the husband's out-of-state earnings. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739.
In Parker. as here, the Tax Commission was not seeking to impose a tax on the husband,

but rather on the Idaho resident wife. The Supreme Court held that"... one-half of [the
husband's] earnings were income attributable to [the Idaho resident wife] for purposes of
taxation." Parker, 148 Idaho at 847. 230 P.3d at 739. As such, the Supreme Court upheld the
Tax Commission's act of taxing the wife's income, "even though derived from [the husband's]
earnings [out-of-state]." Parker. 148 Idaho at 847, 230 P.3d at 739 (emphasis added).
Parker is "on all fours" with the case before this Court. (As noted above. a copy of the
Parker decision is appended to this brief for ease of reference.) There, the Idaho Supreme Court
concluded that the out-of-state husband's wages were income attributable to the resident wife.
This Court should come to the same conclusion and uphold the Board of Tax Appeals decision
that Linda's tax liability includes her one-half share of the income her husband earned out of
state.
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C. There are no constitutionnl prohibitions agninst Idaho taxing the out-ofstate income that belongs to Linda.

There are no constitutional violations here. The facts of this case simply do not implicate
any constitutional concerns. In the pleadings, Plaintiff makes three main constitutional
arguments against having Linda pay tax on her community property share. None of them have
any merit.
1.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Article 4, § 2 of

the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Plaintiff's argument here is founded on the
notion that '"a citizen is not subject to pay a greater amount of income tax than a citizen who
earns income in another state." Petition at 4. However, the Plaintiff misapprehends the situation
here. There is no occasion here for there to be a violation under Article 4, § 2. As in Parker, the
Tax Commission is not seeking to impose a tax on the husband. Barry is nQ! being taxed by the
State of Idaho. Therefore, there is no occasion of Barry having to pay tax in Idaho greater than
what he paid in another state. This argument is without substance. Rather, Linda owes tax for
her one-half share of the wages earned by her husband, as those wages are income attributable to
Linda. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739.

2.

Due Process: In Parker, the Idaho Supreme Court detennined that there is nothing

in the Tax Commission's act of taxing the wife's community property share of income-even
though that income was derived from the husband's earnings out-of-state-to implicate the Due
Process Clause. Parker, 148 Idaho 842, 847, 230 P.3d 734, 739. That is because the "[t]he
Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that a state has the power to tax in relation
to a resident's income derived from sources outside the State and that there is nothing in the
Federal Constitution to prevent this exercise of such power." Parker, 148 Idaho 842, 84 7, 230
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P.3d 734, 739 (quoting Herndon v. West. 87 Idaho 335,340,393 P.2d 35, 37 (1964)). The
rationale behind this is that inhabitants "are supplied many services by their state of residence
and should contribute toward the support of the state, no matter where their income is earned."
lg.

3.

Donnant Commerce Clause: In her Petiti.on, Linda argues that assessing tax on

her one-half share of Barry's out-of-state earnings violates the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const.
"To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated by a tax statute, [a taxpayer] must
demonstrate that the state's taxation of [her] entire income has a substantial effect on an
identifiable interstate economic activity or market." Parker, 148 Idaho 842,847,230 P.3d 734,
739 (internal citations omitted). There are no facts in the record that show that Idaho's taxation
of Linda's entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity.
Plaintiff offers no legal support and no substantive argument for applying the doctrine here. This
argument should be disregarded.
In summary, Plaintiff has identified no actual constitutional defects in this case. Neither
the Privileges and Immunities Clause nor the Commerce Clause are actually implicated by the
facts of this case; and Linda's due process rights were not violated, as the U.S. Supreme Court
has expressly held that states have the power to tax a resident's income derived from out-of-state

sources.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court should conclude that the Board of Tax Appeals' Decision
was correct that Linda Dunn owes income tax on her one-half share of her husband's out-of-state
earnings. This Court should enter Judgment in favor of the Tax Commission.
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A deficiency detennination issued by the State
Tax Commission is presumed to be correct, and
the burden is on the taxpayer to show that the
Commission's decision is erroneous.

148 Idaho 842
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, December 2009 Tenn.
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David and Kathy PARKER, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
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IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant-Respondent.

No.35848.

Appeal and Error
ij,\a- Extent of Review Dependent on Nature of
Decision Appealed from
When appellate court reviews a district court's
decision on summary judgment, it employs the
same standard as that properly employed by the
trial court when originally ruling on the motion.

I
March 17, 2010.

I
Rehearing Denied April 29, 12010.

Cases that cite this headnote
Synopsis
Background: Married taxpayers appealed from decision
of the State Tax Commission finding that taxpayers owed

(3)

income tax on one-half of the income earned by husband
while he was domiciJed in Nevada. The District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Ronald J. Wilper, I.,
entered summary judgment for Commission, and taxpeyers
appealed.

Taxation
P Decisions reviewable, right of review and
presentation of grounds of review
Appellate court would not address married
taxpayers' arsument that the district court
erred in applying Idaho, rather than Nevada,
community property law when determining
whether taxpayers owed income tax on one-half
of the income earned by husband while be was
domiciled in Nevada and wife was domiciled
in Idaho, given that taxpayers did not raise the
choice of law issue to the district court and the
district court did not address the issue or mention
Nevada community property law in its decision.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Horton, J., held that;
[ IJ when wife Willi domiciled in Idaho and husband was
domiciled in Nevada, Idaho's taxation of wife's one-half
interest in husband's Nevada earnings did not violate due
process; and

Cases that cite this headnote
[2] in order to show that the Commerce Clause was

implicated, taxpayers needed to show that Idaho's taxation of
wife's entire income had a substantial effect on an identifiable
interstate economic activity or market, and taxpayers failed
todo so.

Affinned.

West Headnotes (14)
[1)

Tax11don
y,,, Evidence

(4)

Constitutional Law
,;=, Income taxes
Taxation
F Sources of income outside state
When wife was domiciled in Idaho and husband
was domiciled in Nevada, Idaho's taxation of
wife's one-half interest in husband's Nevada
earnings did not violate due process; wife
derived income from her one-half interest in
husband's earnings in Nevada, wife was supplied
many services by the State, and there was
nothing in the Constitution to prevent the State
from taxing her income in return, regerdless of
the fact that the income was derived from a
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source outside of the State, end in taxing onehalf of husband's Nevada earnings, the State
Tax Commission was not seeking to impose a
tax on husband, but rather on wife. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.

(7)

To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated
by a tax statute, a taxpayer must demonstrate
that the stnte's taxation of her entire income has
a substantial effect on an identifiable interstnte
economic activity or market U.S.C.A. Const.
Art, 1, § 8, cl. 3.

Cases that cile this headnote
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Commerce
~ fncome taxes

Husband and Wife
i=- Earnings of husband or wife

Cases that cite this heodnote

Internal Revenue
~ Community or separate income
Tu:ation
y:a Sources of income outside state

[81

Taxation
~ Husbands or wives

Commerce
(? Powers Remaining in States, and
Limitations Thereon
Commerce
""" Regulation and conduct in general;
particular businesses

Husband's earnings in Nevada, where he was
domiciled, were community property, and thus,
wife's one-half interest in those earnings was
subject to federal taxation, and because Idaho's
taxation scheme mirrored that of federal law, for
purposes of computing Idaho taxable income,
just as in computing federal taxable income,
one-half of husband's earnings were included in
detennining wife's gross income. West's I.C.A. §
32-906; J.C. § 63-2002 (Repealed).

The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets
and participants in markets, not taxpayers, and
therefore, the dormant Commerce Clause will
not apply unless there is actual or prospective
competition between entities in an identifiable
market and state action that either expressly
discriminates against or places an undue burden
on interstate commerce, and this impact must
be more than merely incidental. U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

Cases that cite this headnote

Cases that cite this headnote

(6)

Commerce
,w- Income taxes

(9)

Taxation
;p Sources of income outside state

Income tax statute, stating that it is the intent
of the legislature by the adoption of this Act,
insofar as possible, to make the provisions of
the Idaho Act identical to the provisions of the
federal Internal Revenue Code relating to the
measurement of taxable income, says nothing
about the application of federal provisions for
equitable relief. West's LC.A. § 63-3002.

Jn order to show that the Commerce Clause
was implicated, mamed taxpayers, one of
whom lived in Idaho and the other in Nevada,

needed to show that Idaho's taxation of wife's
entire income had a substantial effect on

an identifiable interstate economic activity or
market, and taxpayers failed to identify any
interstate economic activity or market that was
burdened by the taxation of wife's one-half
interest in husband's Nevada earnings. U.S'.C.A.
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
Cases that cite this headnote

Taxation
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Federal income tax equitable relief provisions
did not apply to case involving married
taxpayers, one of whom lived in Idaho and
the other in Nevada, and Idaho's taxation of
wife's one-half interest in husband's Nevada
earnings; federal provisions were designed
to offer individual spouse equitable relief
from tax liability attributable to other spouse,
that is, as between spouses, these regulations
penn.itted fntemal Revenue Service to allocate
responsibility for payment of federal taxes, and
in this case, taxpayers askod court to grant wife
relief from tax liability on one-half of husband's
Nevada earnings and attribute that liability to
husband instead, and if court did this, unlike
under federal scheme, Idaho would lose out on
that revenue, since husband was Nevada resident
and any state tax liability on his Nevada-sourced
income would be owed to Nevada. 26 U.S.C.A
§§ 66, 6015.
Cases that cite this headnote
(ll]

Taxation
y;- Husbands or wives

Federal taxation statute, allowing income
attributable to one spouse to be attributed to
the other spouse if the first spouse does not
file a joint return for any taxable year, was not
applicable so as to relieve wife, who lived in
Idaho, from tax liability on one-halfofhusband's
Nevada earnings; wife was ineligible for relief
under statute because she and husband had tiled
joint returns, and she failed to establish that she
did not know of, and had no reason to know
of, the fact that husband was earning income in
Nevada. 26 U.S.C.A. § 66(c).
Cases that cite this headnote
(12)

States
V"' Revenue and taxation

Taxation
'F Collection and Enforcement
State income tax statutes provide a mechanism
by which the State Tax Commission can grant
equitable relief, and thus, appellate court will
decline to read federal provisions os preempting

them, in particular when those provisions are not
applicable to the case at hand. West's l.C.A. §§
63-3047, 63-3048; 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 66, 6015.

Cases that cite this headnote
[13)

TaHtion
iP- Judicial Review

Although the State Tax Commission did not
specify whether it sought attorney fees for the
proceedings below as weU as on appeal, there
was no indication that it mised any request for
attorney fees with the district court, and thus,
appellate court would only consider whether to
award attorney fees on appeal.
I Cases that cite this headnote
[14)

Tasation
~

Judicial Review

State Tex Commission was entitled to attorney
fees on appeal in connection with taxpayers•
appeal of district court's ruling upholding
Commission's decision that taxpayers owed
income tax on one-half of the income earned
by husband whi_le he was domiciled in Nevada;
despite the fact that Herndon was dispositive of
the due process issue in case, taxpayers failed
to address it in their opening brief other than
to mention that the district court relied on it
in making its decision, and taxpayers urged
appeUate court to consider an issue raised for
the first time on appeal, despite long-standing
precedent that appellate court would not do so.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14: West's I.C.A. § 633049.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
**736 Lawrence G. Sirhall Jr., Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General. Boise, for
respondent. Lawrence Allen argued.
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Opinion
HORTON, Justice.

*844 This appeal involves Idaho state income tax payments
by David and Kathy Parker for income earned in 2003 and
2004. The Idaho State Tax Commission (the Commission)
determined that the Parkers' tax payments were deficient for
those years. David and Kathy sought review by the district
court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Commission. We affinn.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Parkers were married at all times during 2003 and
2004 ("the relevant years"). Kathy was domiciled in Idaho

and David was domiciled in Nevada throughout this time.
The Parkers filed income tax returns with both the Internal
Revenue Service and the Commission declaring their status
as "married filing joint" for the relevant years. Nevada does
not impose an individual income tax, so the Parkers did not
tile tax returns with that state. On their Idaho returns for the
relevant years, the Parkers reported only the income earned
by Kathy while she was domiciJed in Idaho and did not report
the income earned by David.
The Commission conducted an audit of the Parkers' returns
for the relevant years and detennined that one-half of the
income earned by David was subject to Idaho income tax
because Kathy was entitled to one-half of the Nevada income
as community property. On April 2, 2007, the Commission
issued a notice of deficiency to the Parkers, and on Moy 3,
the Parkers' accountant tiled a petition for redetermination
and asked the Commission for a hearing. Following the
hearing, the Commission issued a decision 1 upholding the
dctennination that the Parkers owed income tax on one-half
of the income earned by David while domiciled in Nevada for
the relevant years.
The Parkers timely filed a petition for judicial review of
the Commission's amended decision on February 22, 2008
and made the security deposit required by J.C. § 63-3049.
The Parkers alleged that the Commission's determination wu
"capricious, without a basis in law or fact, arbitnuy and
otherwise erroneous." The Commission responded on March
14, 2008, pointing out that the action should proceed as a
de novo proceeding pursuant to J.C. § 63-3049, mtber than
as a petition for review, and therefore filed an wuwer to

what it tenned the Parkers' "complaint." On June 24, 2008,
the parties filed a statement of "Stipulated Facts" which
specified, among other things, that the sole issue before the
district court was whether the Commission erred when it
determined that one-half of the income earned by David while
be was domiciled in Nevada is subject to Idaho income tax.
On July 1, 2008, the Parkers filed a motion for summary
judgment requesting the coun to require the Commission
to recalculate the Parkers' income tax without the inclusion
of David's income. The Parkers also filed an affidavit from
David in which he stated that he did not receive any
financial assistance from Kathy or have any Idaho-sourced
income during the years in question. The *845 *"737
Commission filed a responsive "Affidavit of Jim Gunter
Regarding Summary Judgment" on July 18, 2008. Gunter is
the tax specialist with the Commission who conducted the
redetenninotion in the Parkers' case. Although styled as an
''affidavit," this document is something between en affidavit
and a legal brief in which Gunter expresses his opinions as to
questions oftex and community property law. In the affidavit,
Gunter asserted that David would have been required to file
an Idaho income tax return even if he and Kathy bad filed
separate returns due to David's share of the taxable income
from certain Idaho real estate income pass-through entities.
The Parkers moved to strike this opinion on the basis that it
was a legal conclusion that was for the court to make and as
speculative and irrelevant.
On October 23, 2008, the district court issued its
combined "Order Denying [the Parkers'] Motion to Strike,"
"Order Denying [the Commission's] Motion to Strike,"
"Order Granting [the Commission's] Motion for Summary
Judgment," and "Order Denying [the Parkers'] Motion for
Summary Judgment." The court found that the Parkers
were not entitled to equitable relief under Idaho law. The
court also rejected the Parker's claim that the Commission's
determination violated the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause. The Parkers timely appealed from the
district court's final judgment in which the Commission was
awarded $36,709.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
(I)
(2) A taxpayer may appeal a determination by the
Commission by filing a complaint against the Commission
in district court. I.C. § 63-3049. The case is to proceed
as a de novo bench trial. I.C. § 63-3049; cf. I.C. §
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63-3812(c). 2 A deficiency determination issued by the

Commission is presumed to be correct, and the burden is
on the taxpayer to show thnt the Commission's decision is
erroneous. Albertson's Inc. v. Slate Dep'I of Revenue. 106
Idaho 810,814,683 P.2d 846,850 (1984).

When this Court reviews a district court's decision on
.summary judgment, it employs the same standard as tbnt
properly employed by the trial court when originally
ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is proper "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,327,
940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
Ill. ANALYSIS

The district court upheld the Commission's decision that onehalf of David's Nevada earnings were taxable because, by
operation of Idabo community property law, those earnings
are income attributable to Kathy. The Parkers urge on appeal
that the district court erred in not applying Nevada community
property law, in not concluding that taxing one-halfof David's
earnings would *846 **738 violate due process, and in
not striking the portions of Gunter's affidavit that asserted
that David received income generated in Idaho. The Parkers
also allege that the district court erred in not holding that
taxing one-half of David's Nevada earnings would violate
the Commerce Clause. Finally, the Parkers contend that the
district court erred in not reading federal provisions for
equitable relief into Idaho tax law. The Commission seeks
attorney fees on appeal.

A. We decline to address whether the district court
erred In applylng Idaho rather than Nevada community
property law.

(3) The Parkers argue that the district court med in
applying Idaho rather than Nevada community property law
and that under Nevada law, David's earnings during the
years in question might be considered separate property.
Specifically, the Parkers allege that the district court erred
in only discussing Idaho community property law when the
Commission, in its amended decision, discussed both Idaho
and Nevada community property law. The Parkers, however,
stipulated before the district court that "[t]he Audit Division

detennined thot one-half of the income earned by Mr. Parker
while he was domiciled in Nevada was subject to Idaho
Income tax because under the community property laws of
Idaho, Ms. Parker was entitled to one-half of the Nevada
income." There is no indication in the record that the Parkers
said anything more regarding the choice of law to the district
court, nnd the district court did oot address the issue or
mention Nevada community property law in its decision .
Accordingly, we decline to address the choice of law issue for
the first time on appeal. Dunn v. Ba11gh, 95 Idaho 236, 238,
506 P.2d 463, 46S (1973).

B. We affirm the district court's holding that the
ta:sation or Kathy's one-half Interest In David's Nevada
earnings does not violate due process.
(4) The Parkers assert that the State of Idaho {the State),
through the Commission, violates due process when it taxes
income earned outside of its borders.
(5) It is undisputed that during the relevant years, Kathy
was an Idaho resident and that she and David were manied
Idaho Code § 32-906 provides that property acquired after
marriage is community property, subject to exceptions not
present in this case. This includes a spouse's earnings. Suter
v. Suter, 91 Idaho 461, 466, 546 P.2d 1169, 1174 (1976). As
David's earnings during the relevant years were community
property, Kathy's one-half interest in those earnings were
subject to federal taxation. Forbush v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo.1979-214, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 871, 1979 WL 3279
(U.S.Tax Ct.) (citing Hopkins v. Baco11, 282 U.S. 122, SI
S.Ct. 62, 7S L.Ed. 249 (1930); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118,
51 S.Ct 62, 75 L.Ed. 247 (1930); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S.
101, SI S.Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed. 239 (I 930)). See also Babcock v.

Commissioner. T.C. Memo.1979-372,39T.C.M. l39(CCH),
1979 WL 3424 (U.S.Tax Cl).
Idaho's taxation scheme mirrors that offederal law. "It is the
intent of the [Idaho] legislature ... insofar as possible to make
the provisions of the [Idaho Income Tax ActJ identicaJ to
the provisions of the Federal Internal Revenue Code relating
to the measurement of taxable income.... " I.e. § 63-2002.
Therefore, for pwposes of computing Idaho taxable income,
just as in computing federal taxable income, one-half of
David's earnings are included in determining Kathy's gross
income. The question is whether the fact that this income
derived from Nevada somehow precludes the State from
taxing it.
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This Court answered the question whether the State may tax
~!)_come earned outside of its borders in Herndon v. West. 87
Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 3S (1964). In that case, the taxpayer
was a resident of Idaho and was also a general partner
in an Oklahoma business from which she derived income.
Herndo11, 87 ldaho at 338, 393 P.2d at 36. The taxpayer
argued that the Stote's attempt to tax her Oklahoma income
violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Id. at 340, 393 P.2d at 37. This
Court stated that:

C. We affirm the district court's holding that taxing oC
one-hair oC David's Nevada earnings does not violate the
Commerce Clause.
(6)
The Parkers also argue that taxing one-bolf of
David's Nevada earnings violates the Commerce Clause. The
Commission argues that because it is only seeking to tax
Kathy's income, albeit income derived from David's Nevada
earnings, the Commerce Clause is not implicated in this case.
(7) (8) "To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated
by a tax statute, [a taxpayer] must demonstrate that the state's
taxation of [her] entire income has a substantial effect on
an identifiable interstate economic activity or market." 71
Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation § 391 (2009) (citing
Stelzner v. Comm'r of Reven11e, 621 N.W.2d 736, 740
(Minn.200 I)).

The Supreme Court of the United
St.ates has made it clear that a stale

has the power to tax in relation to a
resident's income derived from sources
outside the *847 **739 State and
that there is nothing in the Federal
Constitution to prevent the exercise
of such power. The rationale for
allowing a state to compute a tax
on income earned elsewhere is based
on the premise that inhabitants are
supplied many services by their state
of residence and should contribute
toward the support of the state, no
matter where their income is earned.

"The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and

Id. (citations omitt~d).
During the relevant years, Kathy was a resident ofldaho and
derived income from her one-half interest in David's earnings
in Nevada. Kathy Wll5 supplied many services by the State,
and there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the State
from taxing her income in return-regardless of the fact tbot
the income was derived from o source outside of the State.
The Parkers argue, however, that taxing one-half of David's

Nevada income violates David's due process rights because
the only contacts he has with Idaho are bis marriage to Kathy.
With respect to the earnings that the Commission seek& to tax,
however, David's contacts with the State are irrelevant. 3 rn
taxing one-half of David's Nevada earnings, the Commission
is not seeking to impose a tax on David, but rather on
Kathy. As stated, one-half of David's earnings were income
attributable to Kathy for pwposes of taxation. Kathy was a
resident of Idaho. There is nothing in the Commission's act
of taxing Kathy's income, even though derived from David's
earnings in Nevada, that offends due process.

participants in markets, not taxpayers as such." Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,300 [117 S.CL 811,
825,136 L.Ed.2d 761, 781) (1997). Therefore, the donnant
Commen-e Clause will not apply unless there is actual or
prospective competition between entities in an identifiable
market and state action that either expressly discriminates
against or places on undue burden on interstate commerce.
Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300 [117 S.Ct. at 825, 136 L.Ed.2d
at 780-81}. Furthem1ore, this impact must be more than
merely incidental. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559 [115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 637-38)
(1995).

Stelzner, 621 N.W.2d at 740-41.
In order to show that the Commerce Clause is implicated in
this case, the Parkers would need to show that the State's
taxation ofKathy's entire income has a substantial effect on an
identifiable interstate economic activity or market They have
failed to identify any interstate economic activity or market
*848 **740 that is burdened by the taxation of Kathy's
Nevada income.
The Commerce Clause is not implicated in this case.
Although the district court did not reach this same conclusion,
it did ultimately hold that the Commerce Clause would not be
violated by the Commission taxing Kathy's Nevada income.
Thus. we affirm the district court's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the Commission on this issue, albeit for
a different reason.
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D, We affirm the district court's decision not to read
the federal provisions for equitable relief urged by the
Parkers into Idaho tax law.
The Parkers argue that the district court erred in not reading
into Idaho law two federal provisions that they claim would
offer them equitable relief from paying income tax on onehalf of David's Nevada earnings. The Parkers first argue
that Idaho law should include the equivalent of26 U.S.C. §
66, entitled "Treatment of Community Income," specifically
section (c), which states:

(1) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid mx
or any deficiency (or nny portion of either); and
(1) relief is not nvnilable to such individual under
subsection (b) or (c), the Secretnry may relieve such
individual of such liability.

The Parkers point to J.C. § 63-3002 to support their claim

that the above provisions should be read into Idaho law and
applied in this case in order to afford them relief.

(e) Spouse relieved of UablUCy in certain other cases
(9)

Idaho Code § 63-3002 states:

Under regulations prescn'bed by tho Secretary, ifIt is the intent of the legislature by

(1) an individunl does not file a joint return for any taxable

year,
(2) such individual does not include in gross income for
such taxable year an item of community income properly
includible therein which, in accordance with the rules
contained in section 879(a), would be treated as the income
of the other spouse,
(3) the individual establishes that he or she did not know
of, and had no reason to know of, such item of community
income. and
(4) taking into acc01Jnt all facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to include such item of community income in
such individual's gross income, then, for purposes of this
title, such item of community income shall be included in
the gross income of the other spouse (and not in the gross
income of the individual). Under procedures prescribed
by the Secretary, if. taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable
for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of
either) attributable to any item for which relief is not
available under the preceding sentence, the Secretary may
relieve such individual of such liability.

The Parkers further urge that Idaho law should include the
equivalent of26 U.S.C. § 601S, entitled "Relief from joint and
several liability on joint return," section (t) of which states:
(f) Equitable relief

Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if-

the adoption of this net, insofar as
possible to make the provisions of the
Idaho act identical to the provisions
of the Federal Internal Revenue Code
relating to the measurement of taxable
income, to the end that the taxable
income reported each taxable year by
a taxpayer to the internal revenue
seivice shall be the identical sum
reported to this state, subject only to
modifications contained in the Idaho
law; to achieve this result by the
application of the various provisions
of the Fedeml Internal Revenue
Code relating to the definition
of income, exceptions therefrom.
deductions (personal and otherwise),
accounting methods, taxation of trusts,
estates, partnerships and corporations,
basis and other pertinent provisions
to grou income as defined therein,
resulting in an amount called "taxable
income" in the Internal Revenue Code,
and then to impose the provisions
of this act thereon to derive a sum
called *849 **741 "Idaho taxable
income"; to impose a tax on residents
of · this state measured by Idaho
taxable income wherever derived and
on the Idaho taxable income of
nonresidents which is the result of
activity within or derived &om sources
within this state. All of the foregoing
is subject to modifications in Idaho
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law including, without limitation,
modifications applicable to unitary
groups of corporations, which include
corporations incorporated outside the
United States.
This statute says nothing about the application of federal
provisions for equitable relief. Further, we have made clear
that the statute "does not incorporate by reference all
provisions of the federal Internal Revenue Code into Idaho
tax Jaw." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho Slale TtlX' Comm'n.
142 Idaho 790, 796, 134 P.3d 641,647 (2006). Instead. as the
district court properly observed. this Court has relied upon
J.C. § 63-3002 to adopt federal tax provisions where Idaho
law is silent, but has declined to adopt the federal tax code
when it conflicts with Idaho law. See, e.g., Jdaho Stale Tax
Comm'n v. Hautzinger, 137 Idaho 401,403, 49 P.3d 406,408
(2002) (adopting federal elements of tax fraud because Idaho
law did not provide those elements); Lockheed. 142 Idaho at
797, 134 P.3d at 648 (declining to adopt federal requirement
that taxpayers receiving payments under long term contracts
report property under construction in computing income
because under I.C. § 63-3027 property under construction
is excluded). Idaho law does have ilS own provisions for
equitable relief: J.C. §§ 63-3047 and 63-3048. The district
court declined to read the above federal provisions into Idaho
law because it found that I.C. §§ 63-3047 and 63-3048
conflict with those provisions for the reason that, while not
explicitly aimed nt offering equitable relief to a non-resident
facing taxation due to operation ofldaho community property
law. they do "provide for a method by which the taxpayer and
the Commission may compromise a dispute."
(10)
More than conflicting with the Idaho Code, the
federal provisions urged by the Parkers do not apply to
the Parkers' situation. The federal provisions are designed
to offer an individual spouse equitable relief from tax
liability attributable to the other spouse. That is, WI between
spouses, these regulations permit the Internal Revenue
Service to all01:ate responsibility for payment offederal taxes.
Christensen v. C.I.R., 523 F.3d 957,960 (9th Cir.2008) ("The
Commissioner has the authority to relieve one spouse from
tax liability attributable to the other. See, e.g., [26 U.S.C.] §§
66(c),601S(b),(c), (t).")Rev. Proc.2003-61, 2003 I.R.B. 296
§ 4.02(l)(b) ("[T]he Service ordinarily will grant equitable
relief under section 6015(£) ... [if] the requesting spouse
had no knowledge or reason to know that the nonrequesting
spouse would not pay the income tax liability.") If one spouse
is granted equitable relief, the other spouse is liable: the
amount to which the federal treasury is entitled is not reduced.

In this case, the Parkers ask us to grant Kathy relief from tax
liability on one-half of David's Nevada earnings and attribute
that liability to David Instead. If the Court were to do this,
however, unlike under the federal scheme, the State would
lose out on that revenue altogether, since David is a Nevada
resident and any state tax liability on his Nevada-sourced
income would be owed to Nevada. 4
(ll)
Furthermore, 26 U.S.C. § 66(c) alJows income
attributable to one spouse to be attributed to the other
spouse if the first spouse "does not file a joint return for
any taxable year." Christensen, 523 F.3d at 962 ("Taken
together, the similar and separate equitable provisions
indicate that Congress intended spouses facing joint liability
from community property laws to seek equitable relief under
§ 66(c) and spouses facing joint liability from joint tax returns
to seek equitable relief under§ 6015(t).") Kathy would be
ineligible for relief under § 66(c) because she and David
filed joint returns for the relevant years. Kathy has further
failed to establish "that ... she did not know of, and had no
reason to know or• the fact that David was earning income
in Nevada. Again, for this reason she would not be eligible
for relief under § 66(c). Hardy v. C.l.R., 181 F.3d 1002,
1007--08 (1999) ("Because Hardy was *850 ••742 aware
that Mr. Hardy was employed and earning income, she had
reason to know of the taxable income.... Thus, the Tax Court
properly concluded that she d.id not qualify for innocent
spouse treatment under§ 66(c).'')
(12) Idaho Code § 63-3002 does not explicitly state that
the State should adopt federal provisions for equitable relief
from tax liability. That statute has been read as not requiring
adoption of every federal tax procedure, and this Court has
declined to adopt federal procedures when those procedures
conflict with prescriptions in Idaho law. Idaho Code §§
63-3047 and 63-3048 provide a mechanism by which the
Commission can grant equitable relief, and thus we decline
to read federal provisions as preempting them, in particular
when those provisions are not applicable to the case at band.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's decision
not to adopt the federal provisions urged by the Parkers.

E. We award the Commission attorney fees on appeal
(13)
(14)
It should first be noted that although the
Commission does not specify whether it seeks attorney fees
for the proceedings below as well as on appeal, there is no
indication that it raised any request for attorney fees with
the district court. Thus, we only consider whether to award
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attorney fees on appeal. The Commission asks for an award
of attorney fees pursunnt to J.C. § 63-3049, which states in
relevant part that:
{a) Redetermination by the state tax commission may be
reviewed in the district court for Ada county or the county
in which the taxpayer resides or has bis principal office
or place of business by a complaint filed by the taxpayer
against the state tax commission ....

We agree. Despite the fact that Herndon is dispositivc of the
due process issue in this case, the Parkers fail to address it in
their opening brief other than to mention that the district court
relied on it in making its decision. Additionally, the Parkers
urged this Court to consider an issue raised for the first time
on appeal, despite long-standing precedent that we will not
do so. Finally, the Parkers urged a violation of the Commerce
Clause without showing how it applies to this case. Therefore,
pursuant to I.e. § 63-3049(d)(2), we award the Commission
attorney fees on appeal.

(d} Whenever it appears to the court that:

IV. CONCLUSION
(1) Proceedings before it have been instituted or maintained
by a party primarily for delay; or
(2) A party's position in such proceeding is frivolous or
groundless; or
(3) A party unreasonably failed to pursue available
administrative remedies; the court, in its discretion, may
require the party which did not prevail to pay to the

prevailing party costs, expenses and attorney's fees.
The Commission argues that not only is the holding in
Her11do11 v. Wesl, 87 Idaho at 340, 393 P.2d nt 37, (that the
State may tax the income of a resident regardless of where it
derives from) well-settled law, the Parkers failed to disclose
the case in their opening brief, thereby taking a frivolous
position.

We decline to consider whether the district court erred in
applying Idaho community property law. We nffinn the
district court's decision that taxing Kathy's income does not
violate due process; decline to address whether the court erred
in refusing to strike portions of Gunter's affidavit; affinn the
district court's conclusion that the Commerce Clause is not
violated in this cnse; and affinn the court's decision not to read
fedeml equitable relief provisions into ldaho Jaw. Attorney
fees and costs on appeal to the Commission.

Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES
and w. JONES concur.
All Citation&

148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734

Footnotes
The decision was later amended lo correct a clerical error.
1
Idaho Code § 63-3049 does not explicitly state that an appllcalion for review of a decision by the Commission, Hied
2
dlrecUy with the district court Is to be heard de nova. Rather, I.C. § 63-3049(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Redetermination by the state tax commlsalon may be reviewed ... by a complaint filed by the taxpayer against the
state tax commission within ninety-one (91) days after the receipt of notice of the decision of the state lax commission
denying, In whole or In part, any protest of the taxpayer or, within the same period, by filing an appeal with the board
of tax appeals. Upon the serving of summons upon the slate tax commission the case shall proceed as other civil
cases but may be heard by the judge In chambers.
(emphasis added).
In the event that the taxpayer appeals to the board of tax appeals, subsequent proceedings before the district court are
governed by LC. § 63-3812(c). That statute provides that appeals lo the district court "shall be heard and determined
by the court without a jury In a trial de novo on the Issues In the same manner as though It were an orlglnal proceeding
In that court."
As these statutes ere in psrl materis, we conclude that the emphasized language of I.C. § 63-3049 directs that the
district court proceedings are to be conducted de novo without the right to a Jury trial.
The district court rejected the Parkers' argument by polnUng out that
3
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4

[t)here Is evidence In the record sufficient to conclude that during the years at Issue, Mr. Parker had an Interest
In Income producing property located In Idaho. Further, half of the mantel community was domlclled In Idaho. Mr.
Parker has sufficient minimum contacts with the atate of Idaho to subject him to Income tax In the state.
Presumably, the evidence that the district court was referring to Is the Information In Gunters affidavit, contained In
paragraph 24, which Indicates that David had taxable Income derived from Idaho sources during the years In question.
Accordingly, even If the district court erred In refusing lo strike paragraph 24 of Gunters affidavit as the Parkers now
urge, such e"or would be harmless, and we therefore need not address the Issue. I.R.C.P. 61 ("The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect In the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.")
The parties have stlpulated that Nevada does not impose an Income tax.

End of Document
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,

No. CVlS-3329
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
LINDA DUNN

v.
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant/Respondent.

Linda Dunn, through her attorneys, replies to Defendant's Opening Brief as
follows:

There is no burden of proof in this appeal.
The parties agree that this Court's review of the case is de novo. The burden
of proof is irrelevant in this case as the determining facts are agreed upon.
Defendant notes that issues of law are "free review." Since the appeal is on the
question of what law applies and constitutional issues, the burden of proof does
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not apply. It is submitted that there is no burden on Linda Dunn where the
review is de novo and facts are agreed on. The Court must apply the correct law.
The scales of justice are balanced equally.

The Texas law treats Barry Dunn's wages the same as separate property.
Linda Dunn submits that Texas law applies. Since she had no right to
Barry Dunn's wages earned by him in Texas, no taxable income can be applied to
her in Idaho. Linda Dunn had no enforceable right to Barry Dunn's wages since
they were deposited directly to a bank in Texas. The wages are treated as if the
wages were separate property earned before marriage.

They cannot be

transmuted to her as Idaho income.

The Parker case does not apply.
Linda Dunn's Opening Brief at page 2 referred to Parker v. Idaho State Tax

Commission, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010). Defendant contends that the
case is on "all fours." It is not valid precedent for choice oflaw. The reason is that
Parker, id. at 846, never considered what law applied as the parties stipulated that

the Idaho community property law applied. The determinative quotes from the
case are:

A. We decline to address whether the district court erred in
applying Idaho rather than Nevada community property law.
The Parkers argue that the district court erred in applying
Idaho rather than Nevada community property law and that under
Nevada law, David's earnings during the years in question might be
considered separate property. Specifically, the Parkers allege that the
district court erred in only discussing Idaho community property law
Reply Brief of Appellant Linda Dunn - 2
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when the Commission, in its amended decision, discussed both Idaho
and Nevada community property law. The Parkers, however,
stipulated before the district court that "[t)he Audit Division
determined that one-half of the income earned by Mr. Parker while he
was domiciled in Nevada was subject to Idaho income tax because
under the community property laws ofidaho, Ms. Parker was entitled
to one-half of the Nevada income." There is no indication in the
record that the Parkers said anything more regarding the choice of
law to the district court, and the district court did not address the
issue or mention Nevada community property law in its decision.
Accordingly, we decline to address the choice of law issue for the first
time on appeal. Dunn v. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236, 238, 506 P.2d 463,
465 (1973). Id. at 846. (Underlining added.)
The Parker case also notes: "Additionally, the Parkers urged this court to
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, despite long standing
precedent that we will not do so." Id. at 850. Here, the issue of Texas law was
raised before the Board of Tax Appeals (see pages 1, 7 of Linda Dunn's Brief of the
Board of Tax Appeals). Pages attached. The final decision and order before the
Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, page 2, verifies that the issue was raised by Dunn.
It is abundantly clear that the Parker court did not consider the issue, hence, it
is not authority on whether Idaho law or the law where the wages were earned
applies.

The Idaho presumption of community property does not apply.
The Defendant urges the Court, at page 6 of its Brief, to adopt the
presumption of community property. Barty Dunn's paychecks were not payable
one half to Linda. "If community property is held only in one spouse's name as
show by contract, deposit of funds or other evidence of ownership, it is
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presumably 'subject to that spouse's sole management, control and disposition'."

In Re Wiggains, 2015 WL 1954438 at *8 (U.S. Bkcy. Ct. N.D. Texas, Dallas
Division 2015) {construing Texas law). Due to the factual circumstances, the
presumption is sole management special community that is not liable for debts
of the non-earning spouse.
The Parker case also concluded that the Idaho resident "derived income
from her one-half interest in David's earnings in Nevada." Special community
property in Texas is not liable for debts of the other spouse that occur during
marriage. This was held in Patel v. Kuciemba, 82 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. Civ. App.
Corpus Christi 2002), cited by Linda Dunn at page 11 of her Opening Brief,
"Special community property is that portion of the community that is under one
spouse's exclusive control and is not liable for the other spouse's debts." Id. at
596. The Parker case, supra at 739, held that the Idaho resident spouse was
supplied many benefits from Idaho. Barry Dunn's wages are free of Linda Dunn's
debts. If Idaho can collect for the services, Barry Dunn's wages are not liable.
Only Linda's Idaho income is liable for her Idaho services.
"Community property that a spouse would have owned if single includes,
but is not limited to, personal earnings." In re Wiggains, U.S. Bkcy. Ct. N.D.
Texas, Dallas Division, 2015 WL 1954438 at *8, 2015.

The dormant Commerce Clause applies.
The Defendant's Brief, at page 10, argues that Parker also refuses to apply
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the dormant Commerce Clause. Parker was decided in 2010 before Comptroller
of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, __ U.S. __ , 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed.2d
813 (2015). That decision holds that the personal state income tax violated the
dormant Commerce Clause. The Court held that the taxes must be internally
consistent. Failure to allow a credit for income tax paid to another state was a
violation. Parker denied that the dormant Commerce Clause applied because it
did not prove that the "entire income" was affected. Id. at 739. Barry Dunn's
entire income is affected as state tax would be paid where it was not earned. The
place of payment controls. Barry Dunn lived and worked in Texas for a company
that did no business and had no office in Idaho. He was a Texas resident. His
pay was wired to his bank in Texas. Barry Dunn had no physical presence in
Idaho. This case is stronger than Blangers v. State Department of Revenue and
Taxation, 114 Idaho 944, 763 P.2d 1052 (Idaho 1988). In Blangers, the train
traversed the state of Idaho and the State would have furnished emergency
services if the train derailed. Yet, due process was violated and the income was
not taxable. "Idaho has not given anything to the train crews for which it can ask
return." Id. at 951. When Linda stayed with Barry in Texas, she contributed to
his home life. While in Idaho, her contribution, if at all, could only be minimal.
Idaho never gave anything to Barry Dunn. The offshore oil rigs were off the shore
of Texas. Wynne rejected the "undue burden" theory of Parker in favor of the
"practical approach," Wynne, supra at 1796. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const.
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art. 4, cl.2, applies. Every court must follow U.S. Supreme Court law when the
federal commerce clause is interpreted. See, i.e., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d
1155, 1171 (9 th Cir. 2001).
Austin, New Energy and Lunding apply.

The Defendant's Brief argues at page 10 that the dormant Commerce Clause
does not apply. Dunn's Brief at page 4 cites Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S.
656, 95 S.Ct. 1191, 43 L.Ed.2d 530 (1975), a case holding that a tax on non
residents who earn income in New Hampshire are taxed but the New Hampshire
residents do not have to pay the tax on income they earn out of state. The Court
held the privileges and immunities clause was violated. The ruling was based on
disparate treatment of non residents.
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 108 S.Ct. 1803, 100

L.Ed.2d 302 (1988) applies. It held an ethanol fuel tax credit that applied only to
states that had a reciprocal credit was invalid as a violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause. The manufacturer was based in Indiana that did not give a
credit. "The Ohio provision at issue here explicitly deprives certain products of
generally available beneficial tax treatment because they are made in certain other
states, and thus on its face appears to violate the cardinal requirement of non
discrimination." Id. at 274. Idaho allows a credit for income tax paid in another
state. I.C. 63-2039. Here, Texas, like several other states, has no income tax. If
Barry Dunn, the person who earned the out of state wages, had earned the wages
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in Oregon, the taxes would be a credit and the couple would pay no Idaho tax. In
Oregon, each spouse pays tax on their own personal earnings. The important
reason is that Barry Dunn's wages are treated as his separate property. Idaho is
discriminating against his non resident property rights.
Lunding v. New YorkTax:Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139

L.Ed.2d 71 7 (1998) held that allowing an alimony deduction to state of New York
residents and denying it to non residents violated the privileges and immunities
clause. The treatment discriminated against non residents. Id. at 315. The Texas
Constitution prohibits state income taxation.

The eight states that have no

income taxes are discriminated against. The dormant Commerce Clause and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause both are violated.
CONCLUSION

The case must be reversed.
DATED this __k_ day of April, 2016.

SKY, ISB #2435
Attorney for Appellant, Linda Dunn

Counsel for Appellant, Linda Dunn
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Richard W. Kochansky, hereby certify that a copy of this Reply Brief has
been sent by Email and by First Class Mail to:
David B. Young
Phil N. Skinner
Deputies Attorney General
State of Idaho
P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83722-0410
DATED this

iO

day of April, 2016.

, ISB #2435
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,

)
)
)
)

Appellant,

v.
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. CV15-3329
APPELLANT LINDA DUNN'S
OPENING BRIEF

This case is on review of the Idaho State Tax Commission Decision of April
17, 2015, Appeal No. 14-13-1450. The parties have stipulated and have agreed
to submit this case to the Court on the stipulation and briefs of the respective
parties. The opening briefs are due April 1, 2016.
PROCEDURE
Barry Dunn, the worker whose wages are at issue, died in 2012. No probate
of Barry Dunn's estate has been commenced in any state.

Linda Dunn, as

surviving spouse, paid the assessment and by this appeal seeks a refund.
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Idaho. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766,
139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998) involves the same tax as here involved, state income tax.
It denied unequal income tax treatment to a non resident as a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution Art. IV, § 2, entitling
"citizens of each state add to all the Privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several states." This is based on comity between states. "Further, the manner in
which New York taxes nonresidents, based on an allocation of an 'as if' resident
tax liability, not only imposes upon nonresidents' income the effect of New York's
graduated tax rates." Id. at 314. Here, Barry Dunn has sole control of his wages,
but is subjected to Idaho taxes. It is against public policy to apply another state's
laws. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 123 S.Ct. 1683,
155 L.Ed.2d 702 {2003) applied the full faith and credit clause. U.C. Const. art.
IV, § 1, and held that a Nevada Court was not required to apply California law.
The Court would not apply the state of Nevada's tax collection laws to a Nevada
resident. The Court would not balance state tax laws. Id. at 499.

Hansen v. Scott, 687 N.W.2d 247 (S.C.N.D. 2004) followed Hyatt and applied
Texas law to Texas residents. The place where payment is made is the place
where the income was received. See, e.g., Insteel Industries, Inc. v. Constanza

Contracting Co., Inc., 276 F.Supp.2d 4 79, 487 (D.C. Virginia 2003).

Barry Dunn

was paid in Texas. Texas law applies. Courts look to the law of the domicile for
a reason. The domicile has the requisite contacts with a particular individual or
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P.O.BOX36
BOISE, ID 83722-0410
TELEPHONE: (208) 334-7530
FAX: (208) 334-7844
Attorneys for the Idaho State Tax Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)

LINDA DUNN,
Plaintiff,

)
)

-vs-

)
)

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,

)
)
)

Defendant.

CASENO. CV-15-3329

DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF

--------------)
COMES NOW, Defendant Idaho State Tax Commission (Tax Commission), pursuant to
the Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling filed herein, and submits its reply brief in support of
its request for Judgment in its favor, and in opposition to the Plaintiffs position.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Idaho Supreme Court has answered the main question in this case in the seminal
decision of Parker y. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010). That
question is: "Does Idaho have the power to impose an income tax on community property
income derived from sources outside this state?" The answer from Parker is a resounding "yes."
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The Plaintiff's argument rests on the faulty assumption that the Tax Commission is
trying to tax a non-resident, and the assumption that income from an out-of-state source is
disqualified from being taxed by the Tax Commission.
As explained more fully below, under the laws of Washington and Texas 1 the wages
earned by Barry Dunn {Barry) are "community property." As such, and as an Idaho resident,
Idaho law requires Linda Dunn (Linda) to report and pay tax on her community property share of
the community wages earned by Barry. She is liable for tax on income derived from whatever
source, even if it was acquired out-of-state.
Finally, the Plaintiffs arguments about the constitutionality of Idaho's income tax are
flatly incorrect. A short discussion of this will follow.
II.ARGUMENT

For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff's arguments should be dismissed. The Court
should find that the Board of Tax Appeals' Decision and Order are correct, and issue Judgment

in favor of the Tax Commission.
The parties agreed to the salient facts in this case in the Joint Stipulation of Facts, filed
hereinJ February 22, 2016 ("Stipulation"), In this case, Barry and Linda DUM were married for
all the years at issue (2000-2001, 2003-2005, and 2007-2010) ("taxable years"). Stipulation at ,r
2. Linda was an Idaho resident for all the taxable years. Stipulation at ,r 4. Barry Dunn {Barry)
never earned income in Idaho. Stipulation at ,r 7. The income at issue in this case is derived
from his personal earnings in two states: Washington and Texas. Stipulation at ,r 7.
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A. Because Barry resided in community property states for the taxable
years, one-half of his income is attributed to Linda as community
property, and is subject to Idaho income taL

The income in question in this case was earned in two states. Washington and Texas.
Both of these states are governed by community property laws.
The Tax Commission will affirm for this case that Washington and Texas law apply
when characterizing the nature of Barry's wages earned in those states. That is because the
general principle is that the law governing movable property is the law of the domicile of the
property owner. ~ Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 258 (1971). When spouses

have separate domiciles at the time of acquisition of the movable property, ''the local law of the
state where the spouse who acquired the movable [property] was domiciled at the time will
usually be applied." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 258, comment C. As such,
Washington law and Texas law will apply in determining the nature of Barry's personal
earnings. i.e., a spouse's marital interest in such earnings. See also, Matter of ;Estate of Ashe.
114 Idaho 70, 75, 753 P.2d 281,286 (Ct. App. 1988), ~ 117 Idaho 266, 787 P.2d 252 (1990).
In doing an analysis of other states' laws, it is imperative to keep in mind that the

question to be answered only pertains to the characterization of the income earned in those states
as community or separate property. What is not in question is Idaho's ability to impose tax on its
resident's income. This is an important distinction because the Plaintiff conflates the two
concepts throughout its briefing. For example, just because Washington law may apply in
determining whether Barry's Washington wages are community or separate property, it does not
mean that Idaho is somehow invading Washington and seizing Barry's wages, nor does it even
mean that it is taxing Barry's Washington wages. The bottom line is that Idaho is taxing
whatever community property income its resident, Linda, owns due to the wages earned by her
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husband. We will look to other states to determine solely whether those out-of-state wages are
community or separate property.

B. Under Washington law, Barry's wages earned in Washington are
community property.
Idaho, Washington, and Texas are community property states. All three consider wages
as community property and therefore community income. See Idaho Code § 32-906, Revised
Code of Washington (R.C.W.) § 26.16.030, and Texas Family Code§ 3.001.
Specifically, Washington's community property law provides that income earned through
the labor ofa spouse is presumed to be community income. RC.W. 26.16.030; Inre Marriage of
Hurd. 848 P.2d 185 (Wa.Ct.App 1993) ("Earnings arising from services performed during
marriage are community property"). Washington community property laws do provide an
exception to this general principle where the husband and wife are living separate and apart even
though they are not legally divorced. Specifically, Revised Code of Washington§ 26.16.140
provides that "[w]hen a husband and wife are living separate and apart, their respective earnings
and accumulations shall be the separate property of each." Thus, under Washington law,
earnings of a spouse are community property except where the spouses are separated and living
apart, in which case each spouse's earnings are treated as his or her separate property.
However, Washington courts have consistently held that in order for R.C.W. § 26.16.140
to apply, the married couple must be living separate and apart as a result ofmarital discord. See,
Aetan Life Inc. Co. v. Bunt. 754 P.2d 993 (Wash. 1988) (the marriage must be, for all practical
purposes, "defunct."). The Washington Supreme Court has emphasized that the "separate and
apart" requirement ofR.C.W. § 26.16.140 "contemplates permanent separation of the parties-a
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defunct marriage." Thus, the fact that a couple is living apart is not, by itself, sufficient to give
rise to the separate property treatment ofR.C.W. § 26.16.140.
In this case, Linda and Barry were married during the years that Barry resided in
Washington. Linda resided in Idaho. However, PJaintiffhas not argued this "marital discord"
exception to explain their separation. The statement of Stipulated Facts is devoid of any mention
of living separate and apart as a result of marital discord. Linda's decision to live apart from
Barry appears to be based upo_n the exigencies of Barry's career. There are no facts in this
record to carry Linda's burden to show that the marriage was, in essence, defunct. Because of
this, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that the couple was living separate and apart as a
result of marital discord, and the existence of their community is not negated. The income
earned by Barry's labor is presumed to be community income. R.C.W. § 26.16.030. Barry's
earnings are community property and his wife has a one-half interest in them.
C. Under Texas law, the wages that Barry earned in Texas are community
property; Linda has a one-half interest in those wages.

In general, "community property under Texas law consists of all property either spouse
acquired during the marriage 'other than separate property.,,, Douglas v. Delp. 987 S. W.2d 879,
883 (Tex. 1999) (citing Tc:x. Fam.Code§ 3.002); g

@lso, Texas Constitution, Article XVI,§ 15.

In fact, like Idaho, there is a presumption in Texas law that all property held by the spouses is
community property. Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.003. A spouse who wishes to rebut that presumption
in order to show that property is separate property, must do so "by clear and convincing
evidence." Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.003.
Wages that Barry earned in Texas are community property. In Texas, the
characterization of property as either community property or separate property is determined at
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the time ofits acquisition, or at the "inception of title to the property." Boyd v. Boyd. 13 l
S.W.3d 605,612 (Tex. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted). "A fundamental tenet of the
community property system is that whatever is acquired during marriage by the talent, toil, or
other measure of productivity of either spouse is community property. Thus, any spouse's
personal income is community property." Mc:Clary v. Thompson, 6S S.W.3d 829,834 (Tex.
App. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
Texas law allows spouses to transmute all or part of their community property into
separate property, via an "exchange" between themselves. Tex. Fam. Code§ 4.102. Such
property, when exchanged, becomes that spouse's separate property. lg. (Idaho law, too,
provides a mechanism for spouses to contract out of the community property scheme. Idaho
Code§ 32-906.) Such an exchange must be accomplished by a writing and signed by the parties.
Tex. Fam. Code§ 4.104.
There is no evidence of a written exchange or transfer of community property. It is
stipulated that Barry derived the Texas income in Texas, while a Texas resident. The income is
community property which was never transmuted into separate property via exchange. Like the
case of the wages earned in Washington, the record shows that Barry's earnings in Texas
retained their status as community property. It would be clearly erroneous to conclude
otherwise. The Board of Tax Appeals should be upheld on this point.
D. The fact that Barry's personal earnings in Texas can be considered to be
"special community property" with special management privileges, does not
change the earnings' characterization as community property in which
Linda bas an interest.

The Plaintiff makes much of a distinctive feature of Texas law called "sole-management
community property." However, as will be shown, this aspect of Texas community property law
does not deprive Linda of her community property interest in her husband's Texas earnings.
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The general rule in Texas (as in Idaho) regarding management rights to community
property is that community property is subject to the joint management of both spouses unless
the spouses agree differently in writing. Tex. Fam.Code § 3. 102(c). But unlike Idaho, Texas
also provides that some types of community property are able to be managed by just one of the
spouses during the marriage. This type of "sole-management community property" is provided
for by statute and is sometimes called "special community property." Tex. Fam.Code§ 3.102.
For purposes of this discussion, what is important to know is that personal earnings are
subject to sole-management of each spouse. Tex. Fam. Code § 3. I02(a). Specifically, the
applicable statute provides that, during marriage, each spouse has sole management, control, and

disposition of personal earnings. Id. Thus, each spouse can manage, control and dispose of
personal earnings during the existence of the marriage. Tex. Fam.Code§ 3.102(a).
In this case, Barry's personal earnings seem to fit within the scope of this statute and so
during the existence of the marriage, Barry would have had sole management, control, and

disposition of his personal earnings in Texas.

The question becomes: if a spouse has the right to not only manage and control certain
property, but also to dispose of that property, is that akin to the rights associated with separate
property? Said otherwise, is "sole-management community property" really just "separate
property" under another name? Plaintiff argues that Barry's community property personal
earnings were subject to his sole management, control, and disposition, and so his personal
earnings are therefore deemed to be separate property.
However, as will be shown below, Barry's personal earnings did not transmute into
separate property simply because he had management rights to it.
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Under Texas law, property that qualifies as "sole-management
community property" is still "community property," and not "separate
property."

In its brief, Plaintiff argues that Barry's wages were somehow akin to or were actually
separate property. The suggestion seems to be that, since Barry's wages qualify as "sole
management community property" and, because Barry may have had the legal right to control,
manage and dispose of that property, those wages are somehow his separate property.
However, that conclusion is wrong.
Specifically, Texas law is clear that the non-management spouse still retains a
community property interest in the sole-management community property: "Each spouse owns
an undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds regardless ofwhich spouse has

management and control." Massey v. Massey. 807 S.W.2d 391,401 (Tex. App. 1991), writ
denied, 867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1993) (emphasis added). That is, Linda owns an undivided onehalf interest in all community assets-including the personal earnings of Barry during the
taxable years-regardless of the fact that Barry may have been given management and control.
Under Texas law, there exists a "relationship of trust and confidence" between husband
and wife which requires "that a spouse's disposition of his special community property be fair to
the other spouse." Massey, 807 S. W.2d at 402. In other words, the sole-management spouse
"has the burden to show that his disposition of the property was fair." Id. A violation of this
fiduciary relationship "is termed fraud on the community because, although not actually
fraudulent, it has all the consequences and legal effects of actual fraud because such conduct
tends to deceive the other spouse or violate confidences that exist as a result of the marriage ...
Knight v. Knight 301 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (emphasis
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added). Thus, the management rights of sole-management community property are not
unlimited.
This is supported by the fact that, at divorce, Texas law gives the court the power to make
a division of the entire community property estate. Tex. Fam. Code§ 7.001. Moreover, at
death, spouses retain certain interests in the community property. See, Texas Estates Code,§
21.001 et seq. Also, Texas Jaw gives spouses the right to seek a claim for reimbursement in
regard to the entire marital estate, or the entire amount of community property. Tex. Fam. Code
§ 3.401, et seg. Clearly, the fact that one spouse may have sole-management over some

community property does not entirely wipe away the non-managerial spouse's interests in and
rights to that community property.
Thus, as a member of the marital community, the non-managing spouse retains a
community interest in community property. The particular management rights of solemanagement community property are not unlimited and do not strip away the other spouse's
interest in the community property. And in tum, the managerial spouse has responsibilities to the
community for the property. In other words, nothing about the management rights for solemanagement community property under Texas law deprives the underlying community property
of its essential nature. 1

In this vein, the Plaintiff cites to a Texas case, Perez v. Perez. 587 S.W.2d 671 (S.C.
Texas 1979). But Perez says nothing about sole-management community property being
considered to be separate property. Nor does it hold that a non-earning spouse has no rights to

1

This conclusion makes sense when focusing on the plain meaning of the relevant statute. By its very
language, sole-management community property is community property. Tex. Fam.Code § 3. 102(a). It is
almost too obvious to state but, if the Texas legislature intended sole-management community property to
be separate property, it would have just used the term "separate property." Instead, it carved out a scheme
for either joint or sole-management of community property. Tex. Fam.Code § 3.102.
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the other spouse's personal earnings. Instead, the court in Perez merely held that the payment
received by the one spouse was a "gift." Perez, 587 S.W.2d at 673. Gifts are considered
separate property under Texas law. Texas Fam. Code§ 3.001. In this case, we are talking about
personal earnings, not gifts. And personal earnings in Texas are clearly community property.
McClary. 65 S.W.3d at 834. Reference to Perez is not helpful in this case.
In the end, "sole-management community property" is still "community property." Solemanagement community property is subject to special rules on management, but it is not
transmuted into separate property, because the other spouse still has rights to it. Linda, as the
non-managerial spouse ..owns an undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds

regardless ofwhich spouse has management and control." Massey. 807 S.W.2d at 401. Barry's
wages earned in Texas may have been sole-management community property, but they retained
their nature as community property. And Linda still has a community property interest in them.
ii.

The Plaintiff's reliance on Texas law pertaining to "marital property
liability" for debt is inapplicable to this case, because the Tax
Commission is not seeking to subject Barry's property to execution.

The Plaintiff relies on a particular Texas statute that provides that sole-management

community property is not subject to any nontortious liability that the other spouse incurs during
marriage. See, Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.202 ("Rules of Marital Property Liability"); Plaintiff's
Opening Brief at 10-12.
The Plaintiff argues that this means that the sole-management community property in
this case (i.e., Barry's personal earnings) cannot be considered when determining Linda's
liability to the Tax Commission. But this is a misreading of that statute.
Section 3.202, Tex. Fam. Code, merely prohibits a creditor from attaching solemanagement community property to satisfy the non-contractual spouse's debt. Thus, section
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3.202 pertains to whether the property itselfis subject to execution. It is a "creditor's rights"
provision. The statute provides that. if one spouse enters into a contractual debt, a creditor
cannot subject the other spouse's sole-management community property to satisfy the debt. To
underscore that this is a creditor's rights statute, we note that in the same chapter, there is a
section which governs the order of "execution." Tex. Fam. Code § 3.203 ("Order in Which
Property is Subject to Execution°}.
The Plaintiff's discussion of this creditors' rights/property liability statute is inapt. Here,

the Tax Commission is not a judgment creditor seeking to subject Barry's personal earnings in
satisfaction of Linda's debt. It is not attaching Bany's sole-management community property.
This Court is simply not being asked to determine "marital property liability."
Instead, this Court's job is to conduct a characterization inquiry ("Is it separate or
community property?"). Property characterization is something wholly different than
determining the extent certain property is liable against the claims of a judgment creditor.
Plaintiffs reliance on Section 3.202, Tex. Fam. Code ..Rules of Marital Property Liability" is
beside the point.
E. The Plaintifrs constitutional concerns are not implicated in this case.

In its brief, the Plaintiff puts forward several different constitutional arguments.
l.

Wynne: The United States Supreme Court holding in the case known as Wynne

is not relevant to the case before this Court. Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v.

Wynne.

135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792, 191 L. Ed. 2d 813 (2015). The dispute in Wynne involved Maryland's
taxing scheme that did not offer its residents a full credit against the income taxes that they pay
to other states. Maryland's tax scheme created an incentive for taxpayers to opt for intrastate
rather than interstate economic activity. Id. The case before this Court does not involve an
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argument about a credit for taxes paid in another state. The question in this case is whether half
the income earned by Barry in Texas is considered to be the income of Linda by way of
community property law; and if so, is it then subject to Idaho income tax because Linda was a
resident ofldaho during the years at issue. Wynne does not apply.

2.

Privileges and Immunities Clause: The holding in Austin v. New Hampshire,

involving the Privileges and Immunities Clause, is not relevant to the case before this Court. 420
U.S. 656, 95 S. Ct. 1191 (1975). The issue in Austin was that the New Hampshire Commuters
Income Tax scheme fell exclusively on the income of nonresidents and was not offset by other
taxes imposed on residents alone; their taxing scheme could not be sustained because it lacked
substantial equality of treatment for the citizens of the taxing State and nonresident
taxpayers. Austin, 420 U.S. at 665, 95 S. Ct. 1191 at 1197.
In the case before this Court, there is nothing being imposed on a non-resident that isn't
imposed on a resident; Idaho is not seeking to impose tax on a non-resident. Rather, the state of
Idaho is seeking to impose income tax on an Idaho resident, Linda Dunn, based on the principle
that half of the income earned by her husband in Washington and Texas is hers because of
community property law.
3.

Domicile: The Plaintiff persists in arguing that a husband's domicile affects or

somehow controls the domicile of the wife. Plaintiff says, "The domicile of the husband
controls, especially when payment of money is at issue." Plaintiff Opening Brief at 6 (citing a
Texas case from the year 1849). And in its Petition, Plaintiff states, 0 The residency of Linda
Dunn, for purposes of determining whether any of her husband's income derived from his
personal labor, remains at his state ofresidency which is Texas." Petition at 2 {emphasis added).
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However, it is emphatically not the law that the wife's domicile follows that of her
husband's. Of course, there was a time when a ma.med woman's residency was subsumed into
her husband's; however, that is no longer the case. It is clear from the Parker case, as well as all
the modem cases dealing with the domicile of spouses, that a husband and a wife can have
separate legal domiciles.
Ill. CONCLUSION

The Plaintifr s arguments all seem to flow from the view that the State of Idaho is
somehow directly tmcing Barry's wages. However, that view is fundamentally incorrect. The
taxation in this case is not on Barry Dunn or his wages; the only taxation here is on the income of
Linda Dunn, an Idaho resident. The taxes imposed on Linda Dunn's income are proper, correct,
and constitutional.
For this and the reasons stated above, this Court should conclude that the Board of Tax
Appeals' Decision was correct that Linda Dunn owes income tax on her one-half share of her
husband's out-of-state earnings. This Court should enter Judgment in favor of the Tax
Commission.

DATED this 2- -:2- day of April, 2016.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

13~'1

LINDA DUNN,
Petitioner/Plaintiff

CASE NO. CV-15--Mttf.---

V.

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent/Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
PETITION FOR REVIEW

Linda Dunn ("Petitioner") filed this petition for judicial review from a final decision of
the Idaho State Tax Commission ("Defendant"). Petitioner and Defendant have filed a joint
stipulation of facts and submitted the matter to the Court on the briefing. Petitioner is represented
by Robert E. Kovacevich, Attorney at Law, and Richard W. Kochansky, Attorney at Law.
Defendant is represented by David B. Young, Deputy Attorney General.

I.

FACTS
The facts herein are taken from the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties on

February 22, 2011. This is an agency appeal from a decision of the Idaho Tax Commission
entered on April 17, 2015. This appeal was timely filed with this Court. Petitioner paid the
security deposit required to allow this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-3049(b).
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Petitioner was married to Barry Dunn for all the years relevant to this action. The taxable
years at issue are: 2000-01, 2003-05, and 2007-10. During the years in question Mr. Dunn
worked for Udelhoven Inc., a Texas company. Mr. Dunn generally lived and had his place of
domicile in those states in which he was working. At no time was Mr. Dunn domiciled in the
State of Idaho. Mr. Dunn resided in Washington in 2000 and was domiciled in Washington or
Alaska in 2001. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Alaska during 2002. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in
Alaska or Texas during 2003. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas from 2004 through 2010.
Petitioner was domiciled in Idaho during all of the years in question.
All of the wages earned by Mr. Dunn were deposited into his bank account in the city of
Tomball, Texas. Mr. Dunn never performed any work, or earned any wages in the State of
Idaho. Petitioner and Mr. Dunn filed federal tax returns as married filing jointly during the years
in question. The Idaho State Tax Commission levied a deficiency against Petitioner's one-half
community property interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. The decision entered by the Idaho Tax
Commission was only addressed to income Defendant attributed to Petitioner. Mr. Dunn passed
away in 2012. To date there has been no probate of Mr. Dunn's estate.
Petitioner argues the earnings of Mr. Dunn in Texas were special community property
and cannot be subject to the debts of Petitioner. Further, Petitioner argues Idaho's taxation of
wages earned by a non-resident spouse violates the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitutions. Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision
of the Idaho State Tax Commission, a refund of all amounts paid for the years in question, and
that Petitioner be paid interest on the amounts paid.
Defendant argues that it has not imposed a tax on Mr. Dunn, rather it has imposed
personal income tax on Petitioner reflecting her one-half community interest in the earnings of
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Mr. Dunn. Defendant avers that Petitioner is required to report her income and pay tax in Idaho
on her income regardless of the source of that income. Defendant argues that both Texas and
Washington are community property states and both recognize that a non-earning spouse has a
one-half vested interest in the wages earned by the earning spouse. Further, Defendant argues
that as a resident Petitioner is subject to the tax provisions of the State of Idaho. Defendant
requests the Complaint be dismissed, the decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission be
affinned, and all of Defendant's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defending this
action be awarded.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A taxpayer may request review of a decision by the Tax Commission to the district court
by filing a complaint against the Tax Commission pursuant to Idaho Code§ 63-3049. "The case
proceeds as a de novo bench trial in the district court." Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148
Idaho 842, 845, 230 P.3d 734, 737 (2010). The reviewing court will proceed with the review as
it would any other civil case. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho
790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). The court will utilize the Commission record only as the
stated position of a party to the civil action. Id.
II.

DISCUSSION
1. Character of the Wages of Mr. Dunn.
a. In Texas property is characterized as community or separate at the time
property is acquired.

Characterization of property 1s determined by the time and circumstances of its
acquisition. Leighton v. Leighton, 921 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex.App 1996) citing Carter v. Carter,
736 S.W.2d 775, 780 (Tex.App. 1987). "This doctrine, known as inception of title, arises when a
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party first has right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested." Scott v.
Estate ofScott, 973 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.App. 1998).

Personal earnings are community property if earned during marriage. Maben v. Maben,
574 S.W.2d 229,232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Though personal earnings are community property,
Texas law has classified this kind of community property as "special community." Valdez v.
Ramirez, 574 S.W.2d 748, 750-51 (Tex.1978). "Special community is community property that

is subject to one spouse's sole management, control, and disposition." Valdez, 574 S.W.2d at
750-51. Personal earnings are subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the
employee spouse. Medenco, Inc. v. Myklebust, 615 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1981). Each spouse
owns an undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds regardless of which
spouse has management and control. Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975). Generally, the character of earnings as community property attaches when those earnings
accrue. Loaiza v. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d 894, 909 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
Petitioner argues that Texas law applies to the wages of Mr. Dunn and treats those wages
as Mr. Dunn's separate property. Reply Brief L. Dunn at 2. Petitioner avers that she had no
enforceable right to her husband's wages because Mr. Dunn exercised sole dominion and control
over his earnings. Id. Therefore, Petitioner argues that because she had no right in the wages of
her husband the wages cannot be transmuted into community property for purposes of income in
Idaho. Id. Moreover, Petitioner argues that because Mr. Dunn's earnings are special community
property Mr. Dunn's earnings are not subject to liability for the debts incurred by Petitioner.
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4.
Defendant argues that while the law of the state where the wages were earned determines
the character of the property at issue, Texas law provides that wages earned during marriage are
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community property. Defendant's Reply Brief at 3. Defendant contends that Petitioner's onehalf interest in the wages of Mr. Dunn is properly subject to personal income tax in the State of
Idaho. Id.
Texas case law makes clear that wages earned during marriage are community property.
There is no dispute that Petitioner and Mr. Dunn were married during the period of time in
question.

Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas during the years in question.

Petitioner was

domiciled in Idaho during this same period. The issues regarding the Texas wages earned by Mr.
Dunn are whether Petitioner had a one-half interest in those wages and whether wages
characterized as special community property are treated as separate property for purposes of
Petitioner's Idaho income tax.
Wages earned by a spouse domiciled in Texas are presumptively community property
and each spouse owns a one-half undivided interest in those wages. See Maben, 574 S.W.2d
229, 232. Where those wages are earned by one spouse and are subject to the sole management
and control of the earning spouse, Texas law characterizes them as special community property.
Valdez, 574 S.W.2d at 750-51. However, this characterization does not divest the non-earning
spouse of her one-half undivided interest in those wages, nor does it transmute those wages from
community property to separate property as Petitioner suggests. Petitioner's one-half undivided
interest in Mr. Dunn's wages vested at the same time Mr. Dunn's interest vested: when they were
earned.
Special community property does possess some of the characteristics of separate
property. However, Petitioner's argument that special community property cannot be liable for
the tax liability of the non-earning spouse is not supported in the law. In Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965
S.W.2d 690 (Ct. App. Texas 1998), the Texas Court of Appeals held:
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While the trial court can determine whether the parties will file a
joint return or as married filing separately for years preceding the
divorce, the court cannot alter the means of reporting income. It
does have the discretion to apportion the payment of taxes as
between the parties. . . . Thus, a spouse may be liable for the
entire tax liability although the income was totally earned by
the other spouse. If a husband and wife file as married filing
separately, each is liable only for the tax due on his or her own
return. See Edith Stokby v. C.lR., 26 T.C. 912, 1956 WL
725(A)(l 956).

Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Tex. App. 1998) (emphasis added). While Kimsey
dealt with liability of a spouse regarding federal taxes, the rationale sounds in the present case. It
follows that if a spouse can be responsible for the entire tax liability of the marriage, they are
responsible for the liability of both spouses even if the liable party is the non-earning spouse.
Thus, a non-earning spouse may have tax liability even where the income would be considered
special community property. Further, Defendant is not seeking the wages of Mr. Dunn to satisfy
a debt, rather, it is assessing a tax on Petitioner for her one-half interest in income earned during
marriage.
This Court is to determine whether Petitioner had a vested interest in the community
property of the marriage. Under Texas law, as well as Idaho law, this Court determines that
Petitioner did have an interest in Mr. Dunn's wages.
Further, the tax liability in the present case is based on Petitioner's one-half undivided
interest in the Texas earnings of Mr. Dunn. The interest in the earnings of Mr. Dunn vested in
Petitioner at the time they accrued. The Court determines that Texas law is dispositive of the
character of the earnings. Once that characterization is made (as it is here) that Petitioner had a
one-half undivided interest in the wages then Idaho law applies to Petitioner's interest in those
wages based on Petitioner's domicile in Idaho. The state of domicile at the time property is
acquired determines the characterization of property as community or separate. See Berle v.
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Berle, 97 Idaho 452,546 P.2d 407 (1976) (finding marital property acquired in New Jersey prior

to couple relocating in Idaho was characterized by the law of the domicile at the time of
acquisition). Petitioner's domicile at the time she received an interest in Mr. Dunn's wages was
Idaho. Therefore, as an Idaho resident, Petitioner's one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's income is
subject to the tax laws of the State ofldaho.
b. In Washington property is characterized as community or separate at the
time property is acquired.

The character of property is determined by the law of the domicile at the time of its
acquisition. In re Marriage ofLandry, 699 P.2d 214,216 (Wash. 1985). "The theory underlying
community property is that it is obtained by the efforts of either the husband or wife, or both, for
the benefit of the community." Togliatti v. Robertson, 190 P.2d 575 (Wash. 1948). However,
Revised Code of Washington§ 26.16.140 provides that the respective earnings of a husband and
wife who are living separate and apart "shall be the separate property of each." See Beakley v.
Bremerton, 105 P.2d 40 (Wash. 1940) (citing Revised Code of Washington§ 26.16.140). "The

law distinguishes between a 'marital' and a 'community' relationship, the latter concept
encompassing more than mere satisfaction of the legal requirements of marriage. It is the fact of
community that gives rise to the community property statute; when there is no 'community',
there can be no community property." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 754 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Wash.
1988), opinion modified on denial ofreconsideration (July 28, 1988).
In order for earnings attributed to one spouse to be considered the separate property of
the earning spouse there must be some showing that the marriage is defunct. MacKenzie v.
Sellner, 361 P.2d 165 (Wash. 1961). The Washington Supreme Court has defined defunct as

follows:
A marriage is considered "defunct" when both parties to the
marriage no longer have the will to continue the marital
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relationship. In other words, when the deserted spouse accepts the
futility of hope for restoration of a normal marital relationship, or
just acquiesces in the separation, the marriage is considered
"defunct" so that the "living separate and apart" statute applies.
In re Marriage ofShort, 890 P.2d 12 (Wash. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
In the present case Mr. Dunn's wages earned in Washington is properly considered
community property.

There has been no showing that the marriage between Mr. Dunn and

Petitioner was defunct. In order for Mr. Dunn's wages to be considered his separate property
Petitioner is required to demonstrate there was no normal marital relationship and there was hope
for restoration of the unity. This Court determines that Petitioner's marriage to Mr. Dunn was
not defunct as that term is understood under Washington law. Therefore, Petitioner had a vested
interest in the community property wages earned by Mr. Dunn in the State of Washington. As
with the wages earned in Texas, the wages earned in Washington are subject to taxation under
the laws of the State of Idaho as the domicile of Petitioner.

c. Wages earned outside of Idaho by a non-resident spouse are attributable as
income to a resident non-earning spouse.
"Idaho Code § 32-906(1) defines as community property all property acquired after
marriage by either husband or wife which is not separate property as specified in I.C. § 32-903 ."
Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 360, 815 P.2d 1094, 1100 (Ct. App. 1991). The Idaho
Court of Appeals held that all earning of either spouse were to be included as community
property up until the date of divorce. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976). This
includes earnings during any separation. Id. A resident non-earning spouse is generally subject
to personal income tax in Idaho for her community property interest in wages earned in another
state by a non-resident spouse. Parker v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734
(2010). Wages earned by a non-resident spouse in another state are attributable as personal
income to the resident spouse. Id.
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In Parker the Court quoted:
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that a
state has the power to tax in relation to a resident's income derived
from sources outside the State and that there is nothing in the
Federal Constitution to prevent the exercise of such power. The
rationale for allowing a state to compute a tax on income earned
elsewhere is based on the premise that inhabitants are supplied
many services by their state of residence and should contribute
toward the support of the state, no matter where their income is
earned.
Id., 148 Idaho at 846-47, 230 P.3d at 738-39 (quoting Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 P.2d

35 (1964)).
In the present case Mr. Dunn earned wages in Washington and Texas during the years in
question. At no time was Mr. Dunn a resident of Idaho. Petitioner was a resident of Idaho
during all relevant years. During that time Mr. Dunn's wages can be properly characterized as
the property of the marital community pursuant to Texas, Washington, and Idaho law. As a
resident of Idaho Petitioner's interest in Mr. Dunn's wages is attributable to her as income and as
such, is taxable by the State of Idaho.
2. The Commerce Clause.

"To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated by a tax statute, [a taxpayer] must
demonstrate that the state's taxation of [her] entire income has a substantial effect on an
identifiable interstate economic activity or market." Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148
Idaho 842,847,230 P.3d 734, 739 (2010) (quoting 71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation§ 391
(2009) (citing Stelzner v. Comm'r ofRevenue, 621 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.2001)).
Petitioner must show that application of Idaho's taxing statute somehow substantially
affects interstate commerce for the Commerce Clause to be implicated. United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). Commerce is defined as "the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

9
122 of 160

115 S.Ct. 1624 (citation and internal quotation omitted). The purpose of the dormant Commerce
Clause is not "to protect state residents from their own state taxes." Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S.
252, 266, 109 S.Ct. 582 (1989). Rather, "[t]he dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and
participants in markets." General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300, 117 S.Ct. 811
(1997). Therefore, Petitioner must make an initial showing that Idaho's income tax statute has a
substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market.
In Parker the Petitioner sought judicial review of a tax assessment based on one-half of
her husband's Nevada income. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739. The petitioner argued
that Idaho's taxation of her interest in her husband's income violated the Commerce Clause. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court held:
"The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and
participants in markets, not taxpayers as such." Gen. Motors Corp.
v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 [117 S.Ct. 811, 825, 136 L.Ed.2d 761,
781] (1997). Therefore, the dormant Commerce Clause will not
apply unless there is actual or prospective competition between
entities in an identifiable market and state action that either
expressly discriminates against or places an undue burden on
interstate commerce. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300 [117 S.Ct. at 825, 136
L.Ed.2d at 780-81]. Furthermore, this impact must be more than
merely incidental. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 [115
S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 637-38] (1995). Stelzner, 621
N.W.2d at 740-41.
In order to show that the Commerce Clause is implicated in
this case, the Parkers would need to show that the State's taxation
of Kathy's entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable
interstate economic activity or market. They have failed to identify
any interstate economic activity or market that is burdened by the
taxation of Kathy's Nevada income. The Commerce Clause is not
implicated in this case.

Id, 148 Idaho at 847-48, 230 P.3d at739-40.
Petitioner argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Comptroller of
the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed. 2d 813 (2015), stands for the

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

10
123 of 160

proposition that a Idaho's personal income tax scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause
because Mr. Dunn's entire income is affected and Mr. Dunn had no contact with the State of
Idaho.

Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5.

Moreover, Petitioner argues a violation because Mr.

Dunn's income would be taxed in a state where it was not earned. Petitioner also argues that
case law provides that where non-residents are taxed on income earned in New Hampshire, but
residents of New Hampshire are not taxed on income earned out of state violated the privileges
and immunities clause because of the disparate treatment of residents and non-residents.
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6 (citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. 1191
(1975)).

Defendant argues that Parker is dispositive of the matter in the present case.

Defendant's Reply Brief at 11.
Petitioner's reliance on Wynne is misplaced. It is true that the Supreme Court held that
Maryland's tax scheme violated the internal consistency test. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1802-05, 191
L.Ed. 813. However, the reason for the Court's decision was based on Maryland's disparate
treatment of non-resident taxation as compared to the tax paid by residents. Id. The Court
illustrated the disparity showing a non-resident would suffer double taxation under Maryland's
taxation scheme while a resident's tax liability would be half that of the non-resident. Id. The
Court concluded:
[T]he dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause precludes states from
discriminat[ing] between transactions on the basis of some
interstate element. . . . This means, among other things, that a
[s]tate may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it
crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the [s]tate...
. Nor may a [s]tate impose a tax [that] discriminates against
interstate commerce either by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate commerce
to the burden of multiple taxation.

id.

The same facts do not apply here. Petitioner's contention that Mr. Dunn's entire income

is affected is not persuasive. Defendant has assessed tax liability only to Petitioner's one-half
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interest in wages earned in Texas and Washington. The analysis would be the same if the wages
were earned entirely within the State of Idaho, or any other state. It cannot be said that Petitioner
is subject to any internal inconsistency, nor is the tax liability disproportionately applied to nonresidents as compared to residents. Petitioner realized a one-half interest in the wages of Mr.
Dunn pursuant to the community property laws of Texas and Washington and is subject to
income tax on that interest in the State of Idaho. Further, Petitioner's interest is the only interest
subject to Idaho tax liability. Defendant has not assessed a personal income tax on Mr. Dunn's
interest in his earnings. Petitioner has failed to show a substantial effect on an identifiable
interstate economic activity or market and Petitioner has not demonstrated how any economic
activity or market is burdened by the taxation of Petitioner's interest in income earned in Texas
and Washington. Further, there can be no violation of the privileges and immunities clause
because Petitioner has not shown disparate treatment between non-resident and resident tax
liability. Again, it is not the income attributable to Mr. Dunn that is being taxed; Defendant is
taxing only Petitioner's vested one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's wages.
Therefore, the Court determines that Parker is dispositive of the current issue. The
Commerce Clause is not implicated by Defendant's taxation of Petitioner's one-half interest in
the wages earned by Mr. Dunn in Texas and Washington during the years in question.

3. Attorney Fees and Costs.
Idaho Code § 63-3049 reads in pertinent part:
[w]henever it appears to the court that: (1) proceedings before it
have been instituted or maintained by a party primarily for delay;
or (2) a party's position in such proceeding is frivolous or
groundless; or (3) a party unreasonably failed to pursue available
administrative remedies; the court, in its discretion, may require
the party which did not prevail to pay to the prevailing party costs,
expenses and attorney's fees.
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Idaho Code § 63-3049(d). Idaho Code § 12-117 provides for reasonable fees and costs if the
court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho
Code § 12-117. Further, Idaho Code § 12-121 allows the trial judge to award reasonable fees
and costs in a civil action at her discretion. Idaho Code§ 12-121.
This Court does not determine that this review was initiated for purposes of delay, nor did
Petitioner fail to pursue any administrative remedies. The only basis under Idaho Code § 633049 that Respondent may receive fees and costs is if Petitioner's position was frivolous or
groundless.
A position is not frivolous merely because it ultimately fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116
Idaho 687, 778 P.2d 809 (1989). "The sole question is whether the losing party's position is so
plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 92,803 P.2d 993,998 (1991).

The issue presented in the petition for review was not so plainly fallacious as to be
determined frivolous or groundless. There is sparse case law dealing with the issue presented by
Petitioner and the characterization of property as separate or community is generally controlled
by the law of the state where property is acquired. The community property laws of Texas are
similar in many ways to the laws of Idaho. However, there is a distinct difference in the manner
of characterization of wages earned in Texas as compared to Idaho. This distinction, in large
part, provided foundation for Petitioner's argument. It cannot be said that Petitioner's argument
lacked foundation or was plainly fallacious. While Parker is on point with this Court's decision,
in that case there was a stipulation as to what law applied, thus, the Parker Court did not address
the precise issue addressed here.
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The Court determines Petitioner's argument, while ultimately failing, was not devoid of
merit. Therefore, Respondent's prayer for reasonable fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§
60-3049, 12-117, and 12-121 is denied.

III.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner had a vested one-half interest in the wages earned by Mr. Dunn during the

years in question. During that time Petitioner was domiciled in the State of Idaho. Petitioner is
subject to personal income tax in her one-half interest in the wages earned by Mr. Dunn during
the relevant years in Washington and Texas. The Commerce Clause is not implicated in the
present case because Petitioner has failed to show how Idaho's taxation scheme of Petitioner's
entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market.
Further, Petitioner cannot show that Idaho's taxing scheme fails the internal consistency analysis.
Petitioner's argument was not frivolous, groundless, or otherwise lacking a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Commission's Final Decision and Order is AFFIRMED.

DATED this ~ a y of June, 2016.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

14
127 of 160

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was placed in the
courthouse mailing system, postage prepaid, inter office mail, or by facsimile on the __Jr_ day of
June, 2016 to:

[ ] U.S. Mail

DAVID B. YOUNG
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83722-0410
Phone: (208) 334-7530
Fax: (208) 334-7844

[J,Fax

RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309
COEUR d'ALENE, ID 83814
Fax: (208) 765-3867
rwkochansky@hotmail.com

[/4.Mail

ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH
818 W. Riverside Ave., No. 525
Spokane, WA 99201
Fax: (509) 625-1914
kovacevichrobert@questoffice.net

[ ] U.S. Mail
[.}¥ax
[ ] Email

~

[ ] Email

Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

15

128 of 160

s

COUNT
RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
Attorney for Appellant
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 667 -4595 ISB #2435
rwkochansky@hotmail.com

20t, JUl 12 PH 2: 40

ROBERT E. KOVACEVICH, PLLC
Attorney for Appellant
818 West Riverside Avenue, Suite 525
Spokane, WA 99201-1914
Telephone: (509) 747-2104
kovacevichro bert@qwestoffice.net

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR KOOTENAI COUNTY
LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
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IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant/ Respondent.
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TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, IDAHO TAX COMMISSION AND
DAVID YOUNG, ITS ATTORNEY, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF
IDAHO, P.O. BOX 36, BOISE, ID 83722-0410, David.Young@tax.idaho.gov

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant, Linda Dunn, appeals against the above named
Respondent, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final Judgment
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Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs Petition for Review, entered
on the above proceeding on June 8, 2016, by Honorable Judge, Cynthia
K.C. Meyer, District Judge, Kootenai County. A copy of the Order being
appealed is attached to this Notice.
2.

Linda Dunn has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court as she has
paid the tax alleged as due and the order described above in paragraph one
is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17.

3.

The facts are undisputed that Linda Dunn's husband, now deceased, was
a Texas resident and was never an Idaho resident during the years involved.
All the income involved were wages earned by Barry Dunn in Texas while
living there. All his wage income was deposited in a Texas bank. No proof
was in the record that Linda Dunn actually received any of the wage
income. Texas has a peculiar statute, V.T.C.A. Family Code, Ch. 3, § 3102(a)(l), treating wages as separate property. The District Court ignored
the relevant Texas law and held that Barry Dunn's wages were subject to
Linda Dunn's tax debts. This is not the law. See, Montemayor v. Ortiz, 208
S.W.3d 627, 645 (Tex. Ct. of App. 2006). The District Court also failed to
follow Blangers v. State Dept. Of Revenue and Taxation, 114 Idaho 944, 763
P.2d 1052 (Idaho 1988) holding that if the state provides no services and
the income is earned elsewhere. The trial court's opinion distinguished

Parker v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 148 Idaho 790, 134 P.3d 734 (2010)
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at page 13, but nonetheless, applied it. The court also failed to recognize
that the reciprocal credit of state income tax statute, LC. 63-2039, creates
a discrimination against the rule of comity in eight states with no income
tax, U.S. Const. Art. IV§ 2 cl. 3. The District Court failed to recognize the
Texas law has a constitutional provision, Article 8, Section 24, that states
that no personal income tax can be imposed "until approved by a majority
of the voters voting in a statewide referendum held on the question of
imposing the tax."

On July 3, 1890, ". . . Congress passed the Idaho

Statehood Act, admitting Idaho into the Union 'on an equal footing' with the
original states." Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262, 270, 121 S.Ct. 2135, 150
L.Ed.2d 326 (2001). This requires the case to apply Lunding v. New York

TaxAppeals, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139 L.E.2d 117 (1980) giving the
same privileges and immunities in Idaho that Barry Dunn, a resident of
Texas, enjoyed by the Texas Constitution.
4.

No order has been sealed.

5.

The case was heard on stipulation without trial. No record transcript is
requested.

6.

No additional documents are included.

7.

No exhibits are needed to be enclosed.
The appellate filing fee has been paid.
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Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.
DATED this

-rl,

--/-l day of July, 2016.
, ISB #2435
Attorney for Appellant, I.; nda Dunn

~~~~
RBERTE.KOVACEVlcH
Attorney for Appellant, Unda Dunn
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Richard W. Kochansky, hereby certify that a copy of this Notice of Appeal
has been sent by Email and by First Class Mail to:
David B. Young
Phil N. Skinner
Deputies Attorney General
State of Idaho
P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83722-0410

DATED this

/J. ,J, day of July, 2016.

Y, ISB #2435
Attorney for Appellant
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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIB FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

s3~'l

LINDADUNN,
Petitioner/Plaintiff
v.

CASE NO. CV-1~

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent/Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFtS
PETITION FOR REVIEW

Linda Dunn ("Petitioner") filed this petition for judicial review from a final decision of

the Idaho State Tax Commission ("Defendant"). Petitioner and Defendant have filed a joint

stipulation of facts and submitted the matter to the Court on the briefing. Petitioner is represented
by Robert E. Kovacevich, Attomey at Law, and Richard W. Kochansky, Attorney at Law.
Defendant is represented by David B. Young, Deputy Attorney General.

I.

FACTS

The facts herein are taken from tbe Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties on
February 22, 2011. Th.is is an agency appeal from a decision of the Idaho Tax Commission

entered on April 17, 2015. This appeal was timely filed with this Court. Petitioner paid the

security deposit required to allow this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-3049(b).
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Petitioner was married to Barry Dunn for all the years relevant to this action. The taxable
years at issue are: 2000-01, 2003-05, and 2007-10. During the years in question Mr. Dunn

wotlced for Udelhoven Inc., a Texas company. Mr. Dunn generally lived and had bis place of
domicile in those states in which he was working. At no time was Mr. Dunn domiciled in the
State of Idaho. Mr. Dunn resided in Washington in 2000 and was domiciled in Washington or

Alaska in 2001. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Alaska during 2002. Mr. Dunn was domiciled ·in
Alaska or Texas during 2003. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas from 2004 through 2010.
Petitioner was domiciled in Idaho during all of the years in question.
All of the wages earned by Mr. Dunn were deposited into his bank account in the city of
Tomball, Texas. Mr. Dunn never perfonned any work, or earned any wages in the State of

Idaho. Petitioner and Mr. Dunn filed federal tax returns as married filing jointly during the years
in question. The Idaho State Tax Commission levied a deficiency against Petitioner's one--half
community property interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. The decision entered by the Idaho Tax
Commission was only addressed to income Defendant attributed to Petitioner. Mr. Dunn passed

away in 2012. To date there has been no probate of Mr, Dunn,s estate.
Petitioner argues the earnings of Mr. Dunn in Texas were special community property
and cannot be subject to the debts of Petitioner. Further, Petitioner argues Idaho's taxation of
wages earned by a non-resident spouse violates the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and
lmmunities Clause of the United States Constitutions. Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision

I

of the Idaho State Tax Commission, a refund of all amounts paid for the years in question, and

that :Petitioner be paid interest on the amounts paid.

I

Defendant argues that it has not imposed a tax on Mr. Dunn, rather it bas imposed

I

i

personal income tax on Petitioner reflecting her one-half community interest in the earnings of

l

I

I
I
\

I
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Mr. Dunn. Defendant avers that Petitioner is required to report her income and pay tax in Idaho
on her income regard.less of the source of that income. Defendant argues that both Texas and

Washington are community property states and both recognize that a non-earning spouse has a
one-half vested interest in the wages earned by the earning spouse. Further, Defendant argues
that as a resident Petitioner is subject to the tax provisions of the State of Idaho. Defendant

requests the Complaint be dismissed, the decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission be
affirmed, and all of Defendant's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defending this

action be awarded.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A taxpayer may request review of a decision by the Tax Commission to the district court

by filing a complaint against the Tax Commission pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-3049. "The case

proceeds as a de novo bench trial in the district court." Parker v. Idaho Stats Tax Comm'n, 148
Idaho 842. 845t 230 P.3d 734) 737 (2010). The reviewing court will proceed with the review as
it would any other civil oase. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho

790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). The court will utilize the Commission record only as the
stated position of a party to the civil action. Id.

n.

DISCUSSION

1. Character of the Wages of Mr. Dunn.
a. In Texas property is characterized as community or separate at the dme
property is acqu:lred.

Characterization of property is determined by the time and circumstances of its
acquisition. Leighton v. Leighton, 921 S.W.2d 365,367 (Tex.App 1996) citing Carter v. Carter,
736 S.W.2d 775, 780 (Tex.App. 1987). nThis doctrine, known as inception of title, arises when a
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party first has right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested.,~ Scott v.

Estate ofScott, 973 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.App. 1998).
Personal earnings are community property if earned during marriage. Maben v. Maben,
574 S.W.2d 229,232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Though personal earnings are community property,
Texas law has classified this kind of community property as "special community." Valdez v.

Ramirez, 514 S,W.2d 748, 750-51 (Tex.1978). "Special community is community property that
is subject to one spouse's sole management, control. and disposition.'' Valdez, 514 S.W.2d at
750-51. Personal earnings are subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the
employee spouse. Medenco, Inc. v. Myklebust, 615 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1981). Each spouse
owns an undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds regardless of which
spouse has management and control. Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tex. Civ. App.

1975). Generally, the character of earnings as community property attaches when those earnings
accrue. Loaiza v. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d 894,909 (Tex. Ct App. 2004).
Petitioner argues that Texas law applies to the wages of Mr. Dunn and treats those wages

as Mr. Dunn's separate property. Reply Brief L. Dunn at 2. Petitioner avers that she had no
enforceable right to her husband's wages because Mr. Dunn exercised sole dominion and control

over his earnings. Id. Therefore, Petitioner argues that because she had no right in the wages of
her husband the wages cannot be t:ransmuted into community property for puzposes of income in

Idaho. Id. Moreover, Petitioner argues that because Mr. Dunn~s earnings are special community
property Mr. Dunn's earnings are not subject to liability for the debts incurred by Petitioner.

!

!

I

Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4.

i

Defendant argues that while the law of the state where the wages were earned determines
the character of the property at issue, Texas law provides that wages earned during marriage are
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community property. Defendant's Reply Brief at 3. Defendant contends that Petitioner•s onehalf interest in the wages of Mr. Dunn is properly subject to personal income tax in the State of

Idaho. Id.
Texas case law makes clear that wages earned during marriage are community property.
There is no dispute that Petitioner a.nd Mr. Dunn were married dming the period of time in

questiorL Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas during the years in question. Petitioner was

domiciled in Idaho during this same period. The issues regarding the Texas wages earned by Mr.
Dunn are whether Petitioner bad a one-half interest in those wages and whether wages

characterized as special community property are treated as separate property for purposes of
Petitioner's Idaho income tax.
Wages earned by a spouse domiciled in Texas are presumptively community property
and each spouse owns a one-half undivided interest in those wages. See Maben, 514 S. W.2d

229,232. Where those wages are earned by one spouse and are subject to the sole management
and control of the earning spouse, Texas law characterizes them as special community property.

Valdez, 514 S.W.2d at 750-51. However, this characterization does not divest the non-earning
spouse of her one-half undivided interest in those wages, nor does it transmute those wages from

community property to separate property as Petitioner suggests. Petitioner's one-half undhtided
interest in Mr. Dwm's wages vested at the same time Mr. Dwm's interest vested: when they were

earned.
Special community property does possess some of the characteristics of separate
property. However, Petitioner's argument that special community property cannot be liable for
the t.ax liability of the non-earning spouse is not supported in the law. In Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965
S. W.2d 690 (Ct App. Texas 1998), the Texas Court of Appeals held:

I
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While the trial court can determine whether the parties will file a
joint return .or as .married filing separately for years preceding the
divorce, the court cannot alter the means of reporting income. It
does have the dlscretion to apportion the payment of taxes as
between the parties. . . . Thus, a spouse may be liable for the
entire tax liability although the income was totally earned by
the other spouse. If a husband and wife file as married filing
separately, each is liable only for the tax due on his or her own
return. See Edith Stokhy v. C.lR., 26 T.C. 912, 1956 WL
725(A)(1956).

Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Tex. App. 1998) (emphasis added). While Kimsey

dealt with liability of a spouse regarding federal taxes. the rationale sounds in the present case. It

:follows that if a spouse can be responsible for the entire tax liability of the marriage, they are
responsible for the liability of both spouses everi if the liable party is the non-earning spouse.

Thus, a non-earning spouse may have tax liability even where the income would be considered
special community property. Further, Defendant is not seeking the wages of Mr. Dunn to satisfy

a debt. rather, it is assessing a tax on Petitioner for her one-half interest in income earned during
marriage.
This Court is to determine whether Petitioner had a vested interest in the community

property of the marriage. Under Texas law, as well as Idaho law, this Court detennines that
Petitioner did have ari interest in Mr. Dunn's wages.
Further, the tax liability in the present case is based on Petitioner,s one-half undivided

interest in the Texas earnings of Mr. Dunn. The interest in the earnings of Mr. Dunn vested in
Petitioner at the time they accrued. The Court determines that Texas law is dispositive of the

character of the earnings. Once that characterization is made (as it is here) that Petitioner had a
onewhalfundiv.ided interest in the wages then Idaho law applies to Petitioner;s interest in those
wages based on Petitioner's domicile in Idaho. The state of domicile at the time property is

acquired determines the characterization ofproperty as community or separate. See Berle v.

I
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Berle, 91 Idaho 452, 546 P.2d 407 (1976) (fmding marital property acquired in New Jersey prior
to couple relocating in Idaho was characterized by the law of the domicile at the time of
acquisition). Petitioner's domicile at the time she received an interest in Mr. Dunn's wages was
Idaho. Therefore. as an Idaho resident, Petitioner,s one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's income is

subject to the tax laws of the State ofidaho.

b. In Washington property is characterized as community or separate at the
ibne property is acquired.. ·

The character of property is determined by the law of the domicile at the time of its
acquisition. In re Marriage ofLandry, 699 P.2d 214, 216 (Wash. 1985). "The theory underlying
community property is that it is obtained by the efforts of either the husband or wife, or both, for
the benefit of the community." Togliatti v. Robertson, 190 P.2d 515 (Wash. 1948). However,
Revised Code of Washington § 26.16.140 provJdes that the respective eamings of a husband and
wife who are living separate and apart "shall be the separate property of each." See Beakley v.

Bremerton, l0S P.2d 40 (Wash. 1940) (citing Revised Code of Washington§ 26.16.140). "The
law distinguishes between a 'marim.P and a 'community' relationship, the latter concept
encompassing more than mere satisfaction of the legal requirements of marriage. It is the fact of
community that gives rise to the community property statute; when there is no 'community',

there can be no community property.'' Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 154 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Wash.
1988), opinion modified on denial ofreconsideration (July 28, 1988),
In order for earnings attributed to one spouse to be considered the separate property of
the earning spouse there must be some· showing that the marriage is defunct.

MacKenzie v.
f

Sellner, 361 P.2d 165 (Wash. 1961). The Washington Supreme Court has defined defunct as

l

follows:

I

A marriage is considered "defunct,, when both parties to the
marriage no longer have the will to continue the marital

I
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relationship. In other words, when the deserted spouse accepts the
futility of hope for restoration of a normal marital relationship, or
jusf acquiesces in the separation, the marriage is considered
"defunct', so that the "living separate and apart'' statute applies.

In re Marriage ofShort, 890 P.2d 12 (Wash. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
In the present case Mr. Dunn's wages eamed' in Washington is properly considered
community property. There has been no showing that the marriage between Mr. Dunn and
Petitioner was defunct. In order for Mr. Dunn's wages to be considered bis separate property
Petitioner is required to demonstrate there was no nonnal marital relationship and there was hope
for restoration of the unity. This Court determines that Petitioner's marriage to Mr. Dunn was
not defunct as that term is understood under Washington law. Therefore, Petitioner had a vested

interest in the community property wages earned by Mr. Dunn in the State of Washington. As
with the wages eamed in Texas, the wages earned in Washington are subject to taxation under

the laws of the State ofidaho as the domicile of Petitioner.

e. Wages earned outside of Idaho by a non-resident spouse are attributable as
income to a resident non•eandng spouse.
"Idaho Code § 32-906(1) defines as community property alJ property acquired after
marriage by either husband or wife whfoh is not separate property as specified in I.C. § 32-903.''

Desfosses v. Deefosses, 120 Idaho 354, 360, 815 P.2d 1094, 1100 (Ct. App. 1991). The Idaho
Court of Appeals held that all earning of either spouse were to be included as community
property up until the date of divorce. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976). This
includes earnings during any separation. Id. A resident non-earning spouse is generally subject
to personal income tax in Idaho for her community property interest in wages earned in another
state by a non-resident spouse. Parker v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 148 Idaho 842,230 P.3d 734
(2010). Wages earned by a non-resident spouse in another state are attributable as personal
income to the resident spouse~ Id.
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In Parker the Court quoted!
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that a
state has the power to tax in relation to a resident's income derived
from sources outside the State and that there is nothing in the
Federal Constitution to prevent the exercise of such power. The
rationale for allowing a state to compute a tax on income earned

elsewhere is based on the premise that inhabitants are supplied
many services by their state of residence and should contribute
toward the support of the state, no matter where their income is

earned.
Id., 148 Idaho at 846-47, 230 P.3d at 738~39 (quoting Herndon -v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 P.2d
35 (1964)).
In the present case Mr. Dunn earned wages in Washington and Texas during the years in

question. At no time was Mr. Dunn a resident of Idaho. Petitioner was a resident of Idaho

during all relevant years. During that time Mr. Dunn's wages can be properly characterized as
the property of the marital community purmant to Texas, Washington, and Idaho law. As a

resident of Idaho Petitioner's interest in Mr. Dunn's wages is attributable to her as income and as
such, is taxable by the State of Idaho.

2. The Coinmerce Clause.
"To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated by a tax statute, [a taxpayer] must

demonstrate that the state's taxation of [her] entire income bas a substantial effect on an

'

i

identifiable interstate economic activity or market.» Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148
Idaho 842,847,230 P.3d 734, 739 (2010) (quoting 71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation§ 391

(2009)(citingStelznerv. Comm'ro/Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 736, 740(Minn,2001)).
Petitioner must show that application of Idaho's taxing statute somehow substantially

i

j
l
I

affects interstate commerce for the Commerce Clause to be implicated. United States v. Lopez,

l

l

514 U.S. 549, 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). Commerce is defined as '~e commercial

intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches.n Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553,
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115 S.Ct. 1624 (citation and internal quotation omitted). The purpose of the dormant Commerce
Clause is not "to protect state residents from their O\.Vl'l st.ate taxes.,, Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S.

252,266, 109 $.Ct. 582 {1989). Rllther, "[t]he dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and
participants in markets." General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300, 117 S.Ct. 81 J
(1997). Therefore, Petitioner must make an initial showing that ldaho,s income tax statute has a

substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market.

In Parker the Petitioner sought judicial review of a tax assessment based on one-half of
her husband's Nevada income. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847, 230 P.3d at 739. The petitioner argued

that Idaho's taxation of her interest in her husband's income violated the Commerce Clause. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court held:

"The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and
participants in markets, not taxpayers as such." Gen. Motors Corp.
v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,300 [117 S.Ct. 811,825, 136 L.Ed.2d 761,
781] (1997), Therefore, the donmmt Commerce Clause will not
apply unless there is actual or prospective competition between
entities in an identifiable market and state action that either
expressly discriminates against or places an undue burden on
interstate commerce. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300 [117 S.Ct. at 825, 136
L.Ed.2d at 78()...81]. Furthermore, this impact must be more than
merely incidental. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 [115
S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 637-38] (1995). Stelzner, 621
N.W.2d at 740-41.
In order to show that the Commerce Clause is implicated in
this case, the Parkers would need to show that the State's taxation
of Kathy's entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable
interstate economic activity or market. They have failed to identify
any interstate economic activity or market that is burdened by the
taxation of Kathy's Nevada income. The Commerce Clause is not
implicated in this case.
Id, 148 Idaho at 847-48, 230 P.3d at739-40.
Petitioner argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Comptroller of

the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed. 2d 813 (2015), stands for the
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.
proposition that a Idaho's personal income tax scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause
because Mr. Dunn's entire income is affected and Mr. Dunn had no contact with the State of

Idaho. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5. Moreover, Petitioner argues a violation because Mr.
Dunn's income would be taxed in a state where it was not eamed. Petitioner also argues that

case law provides that where non-residents are taxed on income earned in New Hampshire. but
residents of New Hampshire a.re not taxed on income earned out of state violated the privileges

and immunities clause because of the disparate treatment of residents and ·non-residents.

Petitioner•s Reply Brief at 6 (citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. t 191
(1975)).

Defendant argues that Parker is dispositive of the matter in the present case.

Defendant's Reply Brief at 11.

Petitioner's reliance on Wynne is misplaced. It is true that the Supreme Court held that
Maryland's tax scheme violated the internal consistency test. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1802-05, 191

L.Ed. 813. However, the reason for the Court's decision was based on Maryland1 s disparate
treatment of non-resident taxation as compared to the tax paid by residents. Id. The Court
illustrated the disparity showing a non-resident would suffer double taxation under Maryland's
taxation scheme while a .resident's tax liability would be half that of the non-resident. Id. The

Court concluded:
[1]he dormant [o]ommerce [c]lause precludes states from
discriminat[ing] between transactions on the basis of some
interstate element . . . This means, among other things, that a
[sJtate ma.y not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it
crosses state lines than when it OCCW'S entirely within the fs]tate ...
. Nor may a [s]tate impose a tax [that] discriminates against
interstate commerce either by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate commerce
to the burden of multiple taxation.

Id.

The same facts do not apply here. Petitioner's contention that Mr. Dunn's entire income

is affected is not persuasive. Defendant has assessed tax liability only to Petitioner's one-half

?

!
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interest in wages earned in Texas and Washington. The analysis would be the same if the wages
were earned entirely withln the State of Idaho, or any other state. It cannot be said that Petitioner

is subject to any internal inconsistency> nor is the tax liability disproportionately applied to nonresidents as compared to residents. Petitioner realized a one-half interest in the wages of Mr.
Dunn pursuant to the community property laws of Texas and Washington and is subject to

income tax on that interest in the State ofldaho. Further, Petitioner's interest is the only interest
subject to Idaho tax liability. Defendant has not assessed a personal income tax on Mr. Dunn's
interest in his earnings. Petitioner has failed to show a substantial effect on an identifiable

interstate economic activity or market and Petitioner has not demonstrated how any economic
9

activity or market is burdened by the taxation of Petitioner s interest in income ea.med in Texas
and Washington, Further, there can be no violation of the privileges and immunities clause

because Petitioner has not shown disparate treatment between non-resident and resident tax
liability. Again, it is not the income attributable to Mr. Dunn that is being taxed; Defendant is
taxing only Petitioner's vested one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's wages.
Therefore, the Court determines that Parker is dispositive of the current issue. The

Commerce Clause is not implicated by Defendant's taxation of Petitioner's one-ha.Jf interest in
the wages earned by Mr. Dunn in Texas and Washington during the years in question.

3. Attorney Fees and Costs.

Idaho Code § 63-3049 reads in pertinent pa.rt:
[w]henever it appears to the court that: (1) proceedings before it
have been instituted or maintained by a party primarily for delay;
or (2) a party's position in such proceeding is :fiivolous or
groundless; or (3) a party unreasonably failed to pursue available
administrative remedies; the court. in its discretion, may require
the party which did not prevail to pay to the prevailing party costs,
expenses and attorney's fees.
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Idaho Code § 63-3049(d). Idaho Code § 12-1 I 7 provides for reasonable fees and costs if the
court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho
Code§ 12-117. Further, Idaho Code§ 12-121 allows the trial judge to award reasonable fees
and costs in a civil action at her discretion. Idaho Code § 12-121.

This Court does not determine that this review was initiated for purposes of delay, nor did
Petitioner fail to pursue any administrative remedies. The only basis wider Idaho Code § 633049 that Respondent may receive fees and costs is if Petitioner•s position was frivolous or
groundless.

A position is not frivolous merely because it ultimately fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116
Idaho 687, 778 P.2d 809 (1989). '%e sole question is whether the losing party's position is so
plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.;' Sun Valley

Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 92, 803 P.2d 993, 998 (1991).
The issue presented in the petition for review was not so plainly fallacious as to be
determined frivolous or groundless. There is sparse case law dealing with the issue presented by
Petitioner and the characterization of property as separate or community is generally controlled

by the law of the state where property is acquired. The community property laws of Texas are
similar in many ways to the laws of Idaho. However, there is a distinct difference in the manner

of characterization of wages earned in Texas as compared to Idaho. This distinction. in large
part, provided fowtdation for Petitioner's argument. It cannot be said that Petitioner's argument

I

lacked foundation or was plainly fallacious. While Parker is on point with this Court's decision,
in that case there was a stipulation as to what law applied, thus, the Parker Court did not address

the precise issue addressed here.

I
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The Court determines Petitioner's argument, while ultimately failing, was not devoid of
merit. Therefore, Respondent's prayer for reasonable fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§§
60-3049, 12-117, and 12-121 is denied.

m.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner had a vested one-half interest in the wages earned by Mr. Dunn during the

years in question. During that time Petitioner was domiciled in the State of Idaho. Petitioner is
subject to personal income tax in her one-half interest in the wages earned by Mr. Dunn during
the relevant years in Washington and Texas. The Commerce Clause is not implicated in the
present case because Petitioner has failed to show how Idaho's taxation scheme of Petitioner's

entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market.
Further, Petitioner cannot show that Idaho's taxing scheme fails the internal consistency analysis.
Petitioner,s argument was not frivolo~ groundless, or otherwise lacking a reasonable basis in
factor law.

For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Com.mission's Final Decision and Order is AFFIRMED.

DATED this

ny

of June, 2016.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LINDA DUNN,
Petitioner/Plaintiff

CASE NO. CV-15-3329

V.

REMITTITUR
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent/Defendant.

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(t)(2) and (4), this matter is hereby remitted
to the Idaho State Tax Commission. The Idaho State Tax Commission is hereby advised that this
Court's decision, dated June 8, 2016, is final and the Commission is ordered to immediately
comply with the directive of this Court's decision.
DATED this

::21 ~;of July, 2016.
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P.O. Box 36
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(CERTIFIED COPY)

[~.S.Mail

DAVID B. YOUNG
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83 722-0410
Phone: (208) 334-7530
Fax: (208) 334-7844

[ ] U.S. Mail
[JYax

RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309
COEURd'ALENE, ID 83814
Fax: (208) 765-3867
rwkochansky@hotmail.com

[ ] U.S. Mail
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[ ] Email

ROBERT E. KOV ACEVICH
818 W. Riverside Ave., No. 525
Spokane, WA 9920 l
Fax: (509) 625-1914
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

LINDA DUNN,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
Vs.
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent/Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2015-3329

ORDER VACATING
REMITTITUR

-------------~)

An appeal having been filed on July 12, 2016;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Remittitur dated July 21, 2016, is vacated.

Dated this :)/ S

!;;. of July, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed the foregoing ORDER TO APPEAR, postage
prepaid, or by facsimile this dl_ day of July, 2016, directed to:

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION
P.O.BOX36
BOISE, ID 83722-0410
DAVID B. YOUNG
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
P.O.BOX36
BOISE, ID 83722-0410
FAX: 208-334-7844
RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. SHERMAN A VE., STE 309
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814
FAX: 208-765-3867
ROBERT E. KOV ACEVICH
818 W. RIVERSIDE AVE. NO. 525
SPOKANE, WA 99201
FAX: 509-625-1914

JIM BRANNON, CLERK OF COURT

by

Wd

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CASE NO. CV-15-3329

LINDA DUNN,
Petitioner,

JUDGMENT
V.

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission is affirmed.
DATED this

3~y of August, 2016.

JUDGMENT
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was placed in the
courthouse mailing system, postage prepaid, inter office mail, or by facsimile on the _2_ day of
~ ' 2016 to:
~ u5

r

Idaho State Tax Commission
P.O. Box 36
Boise, Idaho 83 722-0410

[ \J'{r.S. Mail

DAVID B. YOUNG
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
P.O. Box 36
Boise, ID 83 722-0410
Phone: (208) 334-7530
Fax: (208) 334-7844

[ ] U.S. Mail
[~

RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309
COEURd'ALENE, ID 83814
Fax: (208) 765-3867
rwkochansky@hotmail.com

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ j..Ji'.ax
[ ] Email

ROBERT E. KOV ACEVICH
818 W. Riverside Ave., No. 525
Spokane, WA 99201
Fax: (509) 625-1914
kovacevichrobert@questoffice.net

[ ] U.S. Mail
~ax
[ ] Email

BY:

JUDGMENT
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Deputy~rk
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL

20li SEP -2 AH

DAVID B. YOUNG [ISB #6380]
PHIL N SKINNER [ISB #8527]
DEPUTIES ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
P. O.BOX36
BOISE, ID 83722-0410
TELEPHONE: (208) 334-7530
FAX: (208) 334-7844

50

Attorneys for the Idaho State Tax Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LINDA DUNN,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

-vs-

)

CASE NO. CV-15-3329

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS IN THE RECORD

)
)
)
Defendant/Respondent. )
)

IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,

______________

COMES NOW, Defendant, Idaho State Tax Commission, by and through its attorney of
record, and, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28(c), requests the following documents be added to
the record (in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28):
I. Statement oflssues (filed May 20, 2015);
2. Joint Stipulation Regarding Scheduling (filed January 28, 2016);
3. Joint Stipulation of Facts (filed February 22, 2016);
4. Appellant Linda Dunn's Opening Brief (filed March 29, 2016);
5. Defendant's Opening Brief (filed April 1, 2016);
6. Reply Brief of Appellant Linda Dunn (filed April 20, 2016); and

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE RECORD - l
Linda Dunn vs Idaho State Tax Commission

Docket No. 44378

0 lG1NA

7. Defendant's Re~l~ Brief (filed April 22, 2016).
DATED this

3 f

day of August, 2016.

DAVID B. YOUNG
DEPUTY ATTORNEY

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE RECORD ~ 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~

I hereby certify that on this "'3 f ¾ay of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the within and foregoing REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN
THE RECORD upon Plaintiff/Appellant as indicated below:

~

ROBERT E. KOV ACEVICH
818 W RIVERSIDE AVE NO 525
SPOKANE WA 99201
[Counsel for PlaintiffAdmitted pro hac vice]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
- - - Hand Delivered
- - - Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy (Fax) (509) 625-1914
___ Email: kovacevichrobert@questoffice.net

RICHARD W KOCHANSKY
408 E SHERMAN SUITE 309
COEURD'ALENEID 83814
[Counsel/or Plaintif]J

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
___ Hand Delivered
___ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy (Fax) (208) 765-3867
___ Email: rwkochansky@hotmail.com

X

DAVID YOUNG
DEPUTYATTO

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE RECORD - 3
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,

vs.
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 44378

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that no exhibits were submitted in
this case.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai
County, Idaho this 12th day of October, 2016.
Jim Brannon
Clerk of the District Court

Debra D. Leu
Deputy Clerk

I -Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,

vs.
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 44378

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the
Attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

RICHARD W. KOCHANSKY
408 E. Sherman Ave., Ste. 309
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83814

DAVID B. YOUNG
PO Box 36
Boise, ID 83 722

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court this 12th day of October, 2016.
Jim Brannon
Clerk of District Court

By:_D_e_b_ra_D_._Leu

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LINDA DUNN, individually and as
surviving spouse of BARRY DUNN,
deceased,
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,

vs.
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION,
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 44378

I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the
County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause was
compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case.
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record was
complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were mailed by U.S. mail,
postage prepaid on the 12 th day of October, 2016
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County,
Idaho this 12th day October, 2016.
JIM BRANNON
Clerk of the District Court

By:

Debra D. Leu

-Deputy
- - -Clerk
--------

